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    ABSTRACT 
 
The Value-relevance of Asset Write-down Regulations in China: 
The Roles of Information Relevance and Measurement Reliability 
By 
YANG Ziyun 
Master of Philosophy 
 
At the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, China 
implemented several new asset write-down regulations. This study addresses the 
claim that these regulations significantly enhanced the usefulness of financial 
statements for investors in China. The effect of the regulations on usefulness of 
financial statements has implications for financial accountants, standard-setters, 
educators, and auditors. This study derives and tests some of the empirical 
implications of the claim.  
I operationalize usefulness of accounting information in terms of the value-
relevance framework, in which information usefulness is construed as a tradeoff 
between relevance and reliability. These two dimensions are the primary criteria 
underlying the FASB’s Conceptual Framework for choosing alternative accounting 
rules. Asset write-down, if correctly applied to over-stated assets, should increase the 
decision relevance to investors; however, measurement errors due to either 
unintentional mistakes involving professional judgment or intentional 
misrepresentations involving earnings management may decrease the reliability of 
reported amounts. While there is substantial value-relevance research, the role of 
reliability is generally absent. Reliability of regression estimates, also known as 
measurement error, is often implicitly assumed and not measured. Following non-
nested model selection techniques and relative measurement error research, I 
explicitly measure the relative reliability of asset write-down accounting in various 
valuation models. Therefore, this study contributes to value-relevance research.       
First, I examine the incremental value relevance of asset write-down estimates 
through their associations with market values: the ability of asset write-down 
provisions to explain market value of equity; the ability of asset write-down gains 
 and losses to explain annual market-adjusted return; and the ability of both the above 
provisions and earnings to explain market value of equity. All the models provide 
evidence for value relevance of asset write-down estimates, indicating an acceptable 
level of information usefulness with mixed effects of relevance and reliability. I 
apply my tests to a balanced panel sample of exchange-listed firms in China over the 
period 1998-2001. The sample is limited to A shares—the shares subject to the new 
rules. 
Next, the above three valuation models are applied again in a reliability analysis. 
Model appropriateness tests, i.e. non-nested model tests, are used to answer the 
question: did asset write-down practices improve reliability in the valuation models? 
I find that the asset write-down practices are approximately comparable in reliability 
to historical cost methods in the balance sheet valuation model but somewhat less 
reliable in the income statement valuation model. The results are ambiguous when 
both assets and earnings are included in a third valuation model. My relative 
measurement error tests yield similar results. I conclude that the asset write-down 
regulations in China have not improved the usefulness of financial statements to 
investors in terms of reliability.  
Because the asset write-down rules are subject to interpretation and judgment, I 
consider the motivation for write-downs in the final part of the study. The results 
support a relation between discretionary motivations and the amount of current or 
cumulative write down. A sub-sample analysis shows that asset write-down rules 
improve usefulness of financial information in the absence of discretionary 
motivations. 
I declare that this thesis 《 The Value-relevance of Asset Write-down 
Regulations in China: The Roles of Information Relevance and Measurement 
Reliability》 is the product of my own research and has not been published in any 
other publications. 
__________________ 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivations 
The accounting system in China has experienced some major changes during 
the past several years. The market experienced a rapid inflow of new accounting 
standards, initiated by promulgation of the accounting regulation for listed 
companies in 1998. The implementation of the new accounting regulation in 2001 
further extended provisions on asset write-down. The rapidity of introduction of 
these standards and the wide-ranging effect of some of them (especially those related 
to asset write-down) constitute an accounting reform. My motivation stems from the 
current debate among standard setters, managers, investors and academic researchers 
about the effectiveness of asset write-down regulations in improving the usefulness 
of accounting information. The government believes that the new regulations 
enhance the truthfulness of reported accounting numbers. However, there appears to 
be a wide divergence of opinions among professionals and academics. The 
disagreements mainly focus on asset write-down regulations. This is not surprising 
given that asset valuation is one of the most contentious issues in accounting. In 
particular, those who favor this reform claim that it “squeezed the water out of the 
financial statement” and “obviously improved the quality of accounting information”; 
while those who are pessimistic about the reform consider it a costless earnings 
management opportunity. Occasional comments in Chinese professional articles have 
revealed some pros and cons of the accounting reform, but the evidence presented is 
not quantitative and the results are not conclusive. The validity of all these claims is 
subject to empirical scrutiny, and empirical results may resolve issues that otherwise 
could hinder further development of accounting regulation in China. The potential 
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implications for a wide range of financial information users have provided incentives 
for this study. 
Consistent with Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001, hereafter BBL 2001), the 
usefulness of accounting information is defined in terms of value-relevance. Under 
this view, accounting information is measured in valuation models and value-
relevance is assessed by its ability to be captured or summarized in share values.1 
Relevance and reliability are primary aspects of value-relevance: information is 
relevant if it supports investment decision-making and information is reliable if it is 
precise and unbiased; tradeoffs between relevance and reliability are important for 
investors in judging firms’ expected values. 
Asset write-down, under various “lower of cost or market” rules, has been 
practiced for decades in the U.S. market, thus research in this area has focused on 
decision-making issues rather than value-relevance issues. Because asset write-down 
has not been addressed by Chinese accounting standards until very recently, whether 
the new convention succeeds or fails to provide more relevant and reliable 
information to investors is an important issue. Therefore, the accounting reform in 
China provides a good opportunity to test the usefulness of asset write-down 
information, as well as the relevance-reliability tradeoffs—issues that few papers 
have investigated before. Evidence on any increase or decrease in the usefulness due 
to these accounting regulations also has important implications for future regulations. 
Hence, research in this area can make both theoretical and practical contributions.  
                                                 
1 For example, value-relevant earnings per share data will be reflected in share prices. Many 
value-relevance studies construct models to capture the relations between equity market values and 
recognized (disclosed) accounting information. Some studies test whether the coefficients on 
accounting numbers are significantly different from zero, with the predicted sign; some studies test 
whether the coefficients are significantly different from the theoretically predicted values; other 
studies focus on the magnitude of differences among estimated coefficients. 
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1.2. Objectives 
 This paper seeks to examine empirically some value-relevance issues of the 
recently issued asset write-down regulations in China. A broad sample of the 
exchange-listed companies will be involved. The first objective of this study is to 
answer the question: is asset write-down value-relevant? Associations between asset 
write-down information and equity market values will be identified. However, 
increases in value-relevance do not necessarily mean that asset write-down practice 
has increased the reliability of reported accounting numbers. Therefore, the second 
objective is to test the reliability of asset write-down estimates through various 
valuation models. The third objective is to uncover motivations behind asset write-
down decisions, given the fact that asset write-down practice could be the result of 
either asset impairment or discretionary considerations. In addition, this paper will 
discuss some emerging econometrics methods in accounting research.  
     
2. Institutional Background  
2.1 Stock Markets in China 
The government of China organized the Chinese stock market as an initial 
vehicle to convert the socialist planned economy into a market economy. Since the 
establishment of stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 and 1991 
respectively, the capital market has grown very rapidly. The Chinese stock market 
has its distinguishing features. First, the market is geographically diversified. The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange operate independently 
from each other in two different cities and have their own indexes. However, both 
4 
exchanges are subject to the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
and, more importantly, have almost identical is trading rules or trading costs. 
Therefore, like previous research, I treat these two stock markets as an integrated 
market. Second, the Chinese stock market offers a variety of securities with 
orientations to different investors. For example, Chinese companies can issue A-
shares, B-shares, and H-shares, all of which have same rights and obligations but 
different buyers, trading locations and pricing currencies. Particularly, A-shares are 
issued to domestic investors and traded domestically in RMB (Renminbi or ¥); B-
shares are issued to foreign investors and traded domestically in US dollars 
(Shanghai Stock Exchange) and HK dollars (Shenzhen Stock Exchange); H-shares 
are issued to foreign investors and traded only in Hong Kong (HKEx).2 Third, the 
stock market has its specific trading rules. 31 December is the statutory fiscal year-
end and all financial statements are required to be published within 4 months after 
the fiscal year-end.3 The exchanges formerly employed a “T+0” trading method, 
allowing investors to buy and sell the same shares in a day, and there was no limit on 
share price fluctuation. Under these rules, the market experienced high volatility in 
its early stages. Later, the CSRC implemented a “T+1” trading rule and a 10 percent 
fluctuation limit, aimed at stabilizing the market. Nevertheless, the market is still in 
its infancy and is politically oriented, resulting in unexpectedly sharp rises and falls.4  
Most of the listed companies are state-owned. A number of papers document 
overestimation of net assets in these state-owned companies. Aharony et al. (2000) 
attribute this kind of overestimation to financial packaging in the initial public 
                                                 
2 A few Chinese companies are listed in the U.S. now. However, they haven’t issued any A-
shares yet so I do not include them in my research sample. 
3 Late publication of the annual report is allowed only in specific circumstances, which is rare. 
4 This may help to explain the relatively low levels of value-relevance of accounting information  
reported in prior Chinese market research.  
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offering (IPO) period.  They report a significant decline in return on assets (ROA) 
from pre-IPO (protected environment) to post-IPO (unprotected, or competitive, 
environment). They conclude that the decline in ROA should be imputed to financial 
packaging—the overestimation of net assets—during the period of IPO. Lee and Cao 
(2002) suggest there is a strong incentive for managers to over-estimate net assets 
and earnings in China. They suggest that when state-owned enterprises in China face 
financial difficulties, one of the ways out of the difficulty is a capital infusion 
through public listing. But the quotas to be listed are limited. Therefore, companies 
must queue for listing, and the order is determined by provincial priorities, industry 
reputation, and most important, financial performance. The management may avail 
itself of asset over-valuation to win the listing quota.  
Another result of vying for listing quotas is that some companies may not have 
enough time to be restructured to limited-liability companies. 5  Some listed 
companies share working places and even management with their mother companies, 
generating even more ambiguous ownership structures. In terms of share structure, 
traded shares often constitute only a small fraction of total shares, with the majority 
of non-outstanding shares held by state agencies, various institutions, and employees. 
All these are latent dangers to the further development of this market.  
The CSRC, one of the authorities in the Chinese stock market, maintains the 
threshold requirements for IPO and stock re-issuance. For example, in the case of 
initial pubic offering, the regulation requires:  
1. raised equity should attain RMB 50 million;  
                                                 
5 For example, some restructuring activities include capital contribution, company securitization 
and separation of board and management roles. 
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2. the company is profitable for the three years prior to IPO, and return on 
equity (ROE) should equal or exceed 10% in the prior two years;  
3. net tangible assets should be at least 35% of total tangible assets.  
In the case of re-issuance, the company should attain an average 10% ROE for 
the prior three years, and at least 6% in each year. In order to protect investors, 
according to The Listing Regulation for Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 
stock shares will be specially treated when a listed company experiences two 
consecutive annual net losses. These shares will be labeled “ST”.6 If loss continues in 
the next fiscal year, share trading will be suspended and the shares are only 
particularly transferred.7 Such shares are labeled “PT”. Otherwise, the “ST” label is 
removed in that year. The “PT” label will be followed by de-listing if the company 
has another consecutive annual loss.  
The IPO regulations and listing rules depend on reliable accounting numbers. 
CSRC cannot prevent companies from generating unreliable accounting numbers. 
Unreliability may even be increased by the threshold accounting requirements.8 The 
accounting reform is an attempt by regulators to address this problem. 
2.2 Accounting Reform 
The accounting regulation for listed companies (hereafter, AR1998) was issued 
in 1998 and is a starting point of the latest accounting reform. Actually, the Chinese 
accounting system has been continually updated, in step with the booming economy. 
                                                 
6 The special treatment includes, among other things, a 5% daily ceiling in price performance and 
an audited mid-year financial statement. Other situations that could incur “ST”: (a) accounting fraud, 
(b) adverse audit opinion, and (c) net assets fall under the registered capital. 
7 Shares can only be traded on Friday with the assembly open price. 
8 Studies have documented that threshold requirements may become the motivations to conduct 
earnings manipulation (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). 
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Before AR1998, listed companies were subject to numerous regulations and 
standards of accounting and finance, known as the “two regulations and two 
standards” system. AR1998 and its affiliated new accounting standards adapt 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) to the current condition of China, aiming 
at resolving the overestimation problem and improving the quality of accounting 
information. AR1998 introduced asset write-down rules. The rules are lower-of-cost-
or-market (LCM) rules and not asset revaluation rules, i.e. revaluation downward is 
required and revaluation upward is not allowed. Although the government urged 
early adoption, listed companies were not immediately subject to these write-down 
regulations, except for companies with B or H shares. Most of the domestic A-share 
companies elected to wait until the issuance of documents No.35 and No.49 in 1999. 
These two documents mandated asset write-down for all the listed companies 
beginning in the year 1999. Asset write-down regulations were expanded in 2000. 
The new regulation, The Accounting Regulation (hereafter AR2001 because it is 
enforced in year 2001), extends the scope of write-down together with other 
conservative methods.9 It also regulates accounting for related party transactions.  
These write-down rules may help in estimating the correct value of net assets. 
2.3 Asset write-down regulations 
AR1998 requires that four assets (accounts receivables, inventories, short-term 
and long-term investments) be assessed for impairment. It sets out factors to be 
considered at each balance sheet date that may indicate impairment. External 
indications of impairment include a decline in an asset’s market value; significant 
adverse changes in the technological, market, economic or legal environment; and 
                                                 
9 For example, organization costs must be expensed immediately rather than being capitalized. 
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increases in market interest rates. Internal indications may be evidence of 
obsolescence or physical damage of an asset; changes in the way an asset is used; 
and evidence from internal reporting that the economic performance of an asset is, or 
will be, worse than expected. If an indicator of impairment is present, these assets 
should be carried at the lower of historical cost or fair value (LCM) and losses are 
recognized in income. Different fair values are specified in AR1998, for example, 
fair value for accounts receivables and long-term investments is the recoverable 
amount, which is the higher of net selling price (NSP) and value in use (VIU); fair 
value for short-term investments is market value; and fair value for inventories is 
NSP. Specifically, write-down provisions are credited and expenses are debited, and 
the provisions offset the original assets. The expense from accounts receivables 
provisions and inventories provisions is carried into operating income and the 
expense from the other two provisions is carried into non-operating income. 
Application of the write-down regulations in AR1998 was optional for A-share 
companies in 1998. It became mandatory for all listed companies in 1999. The initial 
regulations, however, confused many accountants as to how to deal with the 
impairment losses. A direct charge to current profits was preferred; but some argued 
that the impairment could have occurred in prior years so the related loss should be 
charged to accumulated, rather than current profits. Both methods are allowed in 
1998. The follow-up regulations, especially documents No.35 and No.49, gave 
companies the option of a one-time-only charge to accumulated profits in the first 
year of adoption, i.e. 1999. After adoption, the amounts of provisions are either 
recognized or disclosed in the balance sheets and the amounts of losses are 
recognized in the income statements.  
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Listed companies were asked to provide another four write-down provisions in 
AR2001 with effect from 2001, namely fixed assets, construction in progress, 
intangible assets, and commission loans. These four assets are less likely to have 
market values, rendering impairment assessment more difficult. 10  In particular, 
commission loans were rarely recognized by companies in their accounts, let alone 
being subject to loss provisions.11 Again, the listed companies had the one-time 
option of charging the losses related to these four assets to accumulated profits rather 
than to current profits. Write-down losses are not tax deductible except for bad debt 
allowance. Table 1 summarizes the asset write-down requirements. 
[Table 1here] 
IAS 36 articulates the impairment of assets. It requires that all assets are subject 
to the impairment rules of IAS 36 except inventories, construction contract assets, 
deferred tax assets, financial assets and employee benefit assets. It sets out factors to 
be considered which may indicate impairment, and its content is much richer than 
that in AR1998 or AR 2001. In order to operationalize the concept of VIU, IAS 36 
defines the concept of cash-generating unit (CGU). When cash flows are not readily 
identifiable as being specific to a particular asset, the smallest group of related assets 
should be identified. A CGU generates cash inflows that are largely independent of 
                                                 
10  Because of this difficulty, the regulation specifies recoverable amount as fair value, but 
recoverable amount may also be difficult to estimate for these assets. 
11  Commission loans are loans entrusted by the Chinese listed companies to investment 
companies in the expectation of good returns in the stock market. Theses loans were classified as 
short-term or long-term investments, depending on the terms. Commission loans emerged in China 
several years ago when listed companies over-raised funds in the capital market and the stock market 
was prosperous. Aggressive companies lent idle money to other companies, usually investment 
companies, to earn promised lucrative returns, which were often realized in the bull market of the 
period, and became profits to the listed companies. However, China experienced a bear market, and 
many investment companies suffered heavy losses. The promised return was gone and sometimes the 
principal was impaired. Despite that, this practice still exists. It is obviously against the interest of 
minority shareholders if the commission loans are not disclosed clearly and separately in the balance 
sheet. The CSRC uncovered the situation and required independent disclosure and write-down of 
commission loans.  
10 
the cash inflows from other assets or group of assets. The CGU is a reasonable basis 
for write-down of goodwill and head office assets and is likely to be incorporated in 
future write-down regulations in China.  
2.4 Sources of noise in asset write-down and related gains and losses 
Some observers have expressed concerns about the rapid implementation of 
asset write-down regulations, claiming that write-down provides an opportunity for 
earnings management.12 Healy and Whalen (1999) define earnings management as a 
situation in which managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports either to mislead some shareholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. The asset write-down process 
involves discretion, both in identification and quantification. Moreover, write-downs 
and related gains and losses will alter the balance sheet and income statement 
directly. The possibility of earnings management, therefore, does exist. Earnings 
management, if it does occur, introduces noise in the accounting signals.   
A variety of factors contribute noise to write-down estimations. One of the 
motivations of earnings management is meeting simple benchmarks such as avoiding 
losses, reporting increases in profits, and meeting analysts’ expectations. However, 
the last benchmark actually applies only to a small proportion of listed companies in 
China.13 The only benchmarks that matter to all listed companies are avoiding losses 
or reporting growths. Two kinds of earnings manipulation can be observed in the 
                                                 
12 China Securities, one of the leading finance newspapers in China, has published many articles 
on related topics. For example, Four assets write-down, not enough yet (04/08/2000) and Talk about 
annual reports: asset write-down is the key to earnings (30/03/2001).   
13 Because the Chinese market has relatively few analysts, there are not many earning forecasts 
for listed companies.  
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Chinese market—big bath and minimum profit. A firm that experiences losses in two 
successive fiscal years incurs trading and reporting restrictions imposed by the CSRC. 
Maximum daily stock price change is reduced from 10 percent to 5 percent, and the 
firm must submit an audited mid-year financial statement. If the firm cannot turn 
“green” (profitable) in the third year, it will incur further restrictions, such as Friday-
only trading. Both restrictions increase the visibility of these firms and reduce their 
attractiveness to investors, a situation that managers would like to avoid. The big 
bath can be used to shift losses for two years to losses in one year, thereby avoiding 
an “ST” or “PT” punishment.14 The alternative, and more conservative, method is 
maintenance of marginal profit every year, thereby avoiding the CSRC watch list. 
The latter strategy becomes more imperative if the firm has experienced two 
consecutive net loss years. Because the regulations do not formally distinguish size 
of loss, only the continuation of losses, it would appear that the big bath strategy is 
preferable. Informally, however, a very large loss will attract market attention with 
possible political costs and a change in management.15  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are strong incentives to manipulate 
earnings by manipulating the asset write-down provisions and the related gains and 
losses. The cost is low for two reasons. First, the write-down regulation is a new 
regulation to both accountants and auditors. Public accountants may lack sufficient 
experience in assessing impairment in this early implementation period. Most of the 
assets subject to impairment do not have ready market prices and fair values must be 
estimated. VIU estimation involves assumptions and forecasts. Moreover, unlike 
                                                 
14 For example, taking a big bath in the first loss year increases the possibility of a profit rebound 
next year, thus avoiding “ST” status. Taking a big bath in the second loss year, although not avoiding 
“ST” status, could help to avoid falling into “PT” status in the third year. 
15 However, the new regulation was a good excuse to take a big bath, which alleviates the 
political cost greatly.  
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other accounts, auditors do not have comparative data on past write-downs. Second, 
the regulation offers choices to managers, who, in provisions for bad debts, can 
choose among different estimation methods and different write-down percentages. 
Finally, the regulation does not mandate detailed disclosure of the write-down.16 
These factors reduce the cost of manipulation. Unsophisticated investors may 
overlook provision percentages, offset of provisions, and asset swaps.17 Some firms 
have been able to achieve amazing paper profits under the regulation.18  
On the other hand, the monitoring mechanism in the China stock market is still 
primitive and flawed (Chen et al. 2002). Despite the engagement of the CSRC, 
investors remain critical of accounting reform. Auditor independence is impaired 
because of weak corporate governance and rampant intervention by the government, 
with the result that intended reforms often lead to unintended consequences (Lee and 
Cao 2002). Despite expansions and mergers among local accounting firms in China, 
audit quality has been little improved. The monitoring mechanism is further impaired 
because the majority shareholders can withhold important information.  
This paper reports empirical tests of predictions of the value-relevance of the 
mandated asset write-down. Measuring the noise in the write-down amounts is a key 
issue in this paper. Identifying sources of measurement noise will help strengthen the 
conclusions in this paper. Both results could inform regulators about possible 
                                                 
16  AR2001 requires a separate schedule showing write-downs, but not all listed companies 
prepared such a schedule. 
17 Some listed companies swap assets, mainly with their related companies or mother companies. 
The swap may be the most efficient way to generate profit in China. The swap works this way: a 
deeply impaired asset is traded as if no impairment has ever occurred; the write-down provisions are 
then taken back, increasing the current earnings. The “profit” generated by a swap is against the 
regulation. Without sufficient disclosure of the write-down provisions, it is hard to trace the source of 
the profits.  
18 By an asset swap and writing back the provision made in the prior year, ST Shenxinkai, a listed 
company in China, increased its profits by 2200 percent in fiscal year 2001.  
13 
problems of their existing write-down policies, and further, give relief to auditors 
who are bearing increasing risks nowadays.   
 
3. Literature Review  
3.1. The value-relevance research  
Reflecting in part the wealth of valuation models, there are many studies on the 
empirical relation between stock market values (or changes in values) and particular 
accounting numbers. One purpose of this research is to assess, or provide a basis for 
assessing, usefulness of those numbers in an accounting standard. 19  With 
comprehensive analyses of relations between write-down numbers and market values, 
this study contributes to a line of research that has been called the “value-relevance” 
literature (Holthausen and Watts 2001, here after HW2001). Three categories of 
value-relevance research may be identified: relative association studies, incremental 
association studies, and marginal information content studies. The first two 
categories are called association studies. The relative and incremental studies both 
capture associations between stock market values and accounting numbers over 
relative long windows. The only difference between these two types of studies is that 
the degree of association is compared relatively between alternative bottom line 
measures in the relative studies and incrementally among different independent 
variables in the incremental ones. The third category typically includes event studies 
using a short window to determine if the release of an accounting number is 
associated with value changes. Despite its popularity, HW2001 criticize the 
                                                 
19 There are papers addressing the value-relevance of accounting information without regard to 
standard setting. For example, the information content research and earnings response coefficient 
research (Kothari 2001).  
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usefulness of value-relevance research in standard setting. They conclude that the 
association criterion is not theoretically rigorous and that the models used in the 
literature are not well-specified. BBL2001, on the other hand, support the usefulness 
of value-relevance research in standard setting. The opposing views are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. As value-relevance research develops, it is more 
firmly grounded in theory, and the models employed are better specified. Thus value-
relevance research may become more important to standard setting.  
3.1.1. Value-relevance research over long-term periods 
This area of research examines the time-series behavior of the value-relevance 
of accounting numbers. A large sample of companies and a long time period are 
often employed in this kind of research in order to abstract from transitory and 
individual firm effects. Ely and Waymire (1999) examine earnings’ value-relevance 
under different accounting regimes, namely, CAP (Committee on Accounting), APB 
(Accounting Principles Board), and FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board). 
They examine earnings for yearly samples of NYSE common stocks during 1927-
1993 and point out that earnings’ value-relevance varies when the accounting regime 
changes. They measure value-relevance by adjusted R-squares of a cross-sectional 
regression model of 16-month market-adjusted returns on annual earnings change 
and level. However, their argument is weakened by a research design that does not 
permit causal inferences. They do suggest additional research to examine the impact 
of specific standards on value-relevance of accounting data. 
In another paper, Francis and Schipper (1999) investigate the claim that 
financial accounting information has become less value-relevant over time, 
specifically over the period 1952-94. They test value-relevance using two measures: 
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the ability of earnings to explain annual market-adjusted returns and the ability of 
earnings and book values of assets and liabilities to explain market values of equity. 
They argue that if value-relevance of financial statement information has declined 
over time, they should expect to observe a decline in earnings’ ability to explain the 
cross-sectional variation in security returns. Similarly, they expect that, if value-
relevance of balance sheet information has declined over time, the ability of these 
variables to explain market equity values will also decline. The results show that the 
explanatory power of the book value of equity increased, while that of earnings 
decreased, during the test periods. Their paper provides measures of value-relevance 
for both balance sheet and income statement numbers. 
There are a few papers that focus on value-relevance issues in the Chinese 
capital market, such as Chen, Chen, and Su (2001a). They find that accounting 
information is value-relevant both in price models and income statement models in 
the period 1992 to 1998. Chen, Chen, and Su (2001b), investigate the institutional 
setting in China. They find that modified opinions of independent auditors are related 
with earnings management for meeting the regulatory profitability requirements. 
Similarly, Lee and Cao (2002) investigate earnings in China and conclude that value-
relevant accounting information is related to regulations. All the evidence shows that 
despite the primitive setting in Chinese capital market, accounting information is 
value-relevant to some degree. 
3.1.2. Fair value accounting research 
Another kind of value-relevant research—fair value accounting research—is a 
primary focus of the FASB and IASB (International Accounting Standards Board). 
Advocates of fair value accounting believe that it provides more relevant measures of 
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assets, liabilities and earnings than historical cost accounting (Barth 1994). Fair value 
accounting involves the recognition or disclosure of current costs or market values of 
assets and liabilities, as well as earnings derived from fair values. Numerous 
standards have focused on fair value accounting issues over the past decades.20 I 
summarize this sort of value-relevance research here because fair value accounting 
and LCM accounting are related. Both are mandated by standards, and both provide, 
in effect, a book value and a fair value.21 BBL2001 classify several sets of fair value 
accounting studies. 
One set of studies focuses on pension and other postretirement obligations 
(OPEB). A fundamental question relating to pensions and OPEB is whether pension 
assets and liabilities and OPEB liabilities are perceived by investors as assets and 
liabilities of the firm.22 Findings suggest that these assets and liabilities are perceived 
by investors as assets and liabilities of the firm but with reduced reliability, causing 
smaller pricing multiples (Amir 1993, Barth 1991, Barth, Beaver and Landsman 
1992). 
Another set of studies addresses questions relating to fair values of debt and 
equity securities. Barth (1994) investigates how disclosed fair value estimates of 
banks’ investment securities and gains and losses based on those estimates are 
reflected in share prices in comparison with historical costs. She tests the incremental 
explanatory power of disclosed fair value estimates and gains/losses by adding these 
                                                 
20 Great effort has been put on financial instruments, e.g. SFAS Nos. 105, 107, 114, 115, 118, 119, 
125, 133, and 138, and Preliminary Views, 1999; IAS Nos. 32 and 39 are among the longest of the 
international accounting standards. 
21 The accounting reform in China follows the lower of cost or market model rather than fair 
value accounting. That is, it is more conservative than that of the FASB and IASB and prohibits 
upward revaluation of assets. Fair values in China are disclosed only if they are lower than book 
values. 
22 A positive (negative) relation should exist between assets (liabilities) and share prices. 
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to the balance sheet and income statement models respectively. A coefficient 
significantly different from zero implies value-relevance. The findings indicate that 
fair values have explanatory power beyond historical cost, and are robust to several 
alternative specifications. The relevance of fair value gains and losses differ with 
different specifications, which implies they are estimated with sufficient error to 
make value-relevance difficult to establish. Furthermore, Barth discusses the 
reliability of fair value amounts in several aspects, thereby providing a basis for the 
measurement error research that I review next. Another paper in this set is Barth, 
Beaver and Landsman (1996). It provides evidence that fair value estimates of loans, 
securities and long-term debt disclosed under SFAS No.107 provide significant 
explanatory power for bank share prices beyond that provided by related book values.  
Other studies question the reliability of some fair values, such as those for non-
financial intangible assets, derivatives and tangible long-lived assets. A fundamental 
question these studies address is whether these fair value estimates are reliable. 
These studies do not consistently find significant value-relevance for fair values. For 
example, estimates for intangible assets have a significantly positive relation with 
share prices and this finding holds for a variety of revalued intangible assets and 
brands (Aboody and Lev 1998, Eccher, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan, 1996), while 
studies generally fail to find value-relevance for tangible long-lived assets or 
derivatives (Beaver and Ryan 1985). The finding is usually attributed to biased and 
unbiased measurement error, where management discretion introduces biased error. 
3.2. Reliability and the measurement error research 
As I noted in section 3.1.2, although the reliability of fair value numbers is often 
questioned, a significant incremental association, reflected in a significant coefficient 
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on fair value accounting data, is found in most of the papers and interpreted as 
evidence that the accounting number meets the FASB’s two prime criteria of 
relevance and reliability (HW2001). The FASB’s Conceptual Framework is set forth 
in Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) Nos. 1 through 7, which 
articulate FASB’s objectives and criteria in its standard setting decisions. Under 
SFAC No. 5, an accounting amount is relevant if it is capable of making a difference 
to financial statement users’ decisions; an accounting amount is reliable if it 
represents what it purports to represent. The accounting amount has a predicted 
significant relation with share prices only if the amount reflects information that is 
relevant to investors in valuing the firm and is measured reliably enough to be 
reflected in share prices. However, results for relevance and reliability are mixed in 
the incremental value-relevance research. Increased relevance can offset decreased 
reliability so that the final result is value-relevant. Assuming that an accounting 
regulation mandates relevant information, reliability becomes a more important issue. 
For example, both cash flows and earrings are relevant in the decision-making 
process, and both show value-relevance in the empirical research. However, 
reliability may well be different for these two measurements, resulting in different 
levels of observed effect in valuation models.  
Recent years have seen emerging studies on reliability. Managements 
responsible for preparing financial statements have better information than auditors 
and investors and have an incentive to misrepresent due to, for example, the 
compensation problem. The reliability studies suggest that management discretion 
(biased measurement error) and unbiased estimation error—together known as 
measurement error—play an important role in reducing information usefulness. The 
measurement error interpretation is especially important to the fair value accounting 
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debate because critics of the method cite the questionable reliability of fair value 
estimates as a major reason against using fair value accounting (Barth 1994).  
Though some papers attribute insignificant value-relevance to measurement 
error, they neither quantify the error nor demonstrate the way error affects value-
relevance. Measurement error research is an emerging topic (Barth 1991, 1994, Choi 
et al. 1997, Boone 2002). These studies are based on 1970’s econometrics research 
and attempt to use measurement errors to explain the quality of accounting 
information. The main idea of measurement error research is that, assuming efficient 
markets, errors and biases will be reflected in the value-relevance of accounting 
numbers. For example, if all the accounting numbers are true and unbiased, 
according to the measurement perspective, they should fit the theoretical models 
perfectly and have a zero estimated intercept, a theoretically correct estimated slope 
coefficient, and a zero residual. Actually, accounting numbers have measurement 
error, and thus the estimated regression model has observed error terms and 
coefficients that differ from those predicted. The magnitude and sign of the bias is 
dependent on the correlation structure among the true values of the independent 
variables and the measurement error (Barth 1991). 
One group of papers attempts to quantify and compare the specific errors in 
balance sheet accounting numbers. I call this measurement error research. This 
research is distinguished by its “one to one” assumption that one dollar of assets 
should be priced at one dollar if measured correctly. Barth (1991) investigates 
measures of pension assets and liabilities disclosed under SFAS 87 to determine 
which most closely reflect intrinsic values that investors implicitly assign. 
Measurement errors are investigated through their variances, which are estimated and 
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further evaluated with chi-square tests in her 1991 paper.23 The larger the variance is, 
the bigger the measurement error is. The fair value of plan assets is found to have 
less measurement error than that disclosed in SFAS 87 and the book value of pension 
assets. The results also indicate that accumulated benefit obligation exhibits the least 
measurement error. The study has policy implications for SFAS 87 and is consistent 
with investors viewing the compromises made in SFAS 87 as rendering the amounts 
to be recognized less relevant and reliable than disclosed measures. Choi et al. (1997) 
extend Barth’s setting and measure the “noise ratio,” defined as the ratio of 
measurement error variance to the total variance of the accounting measure. Balance 
sheet items with large noise ratios are interpreted as lacking reliability. Boone (2002) 
further compares measurement errors in the oil and gas assets and finds that that 
measurement error in present value measure is on average less than that in the 
historical cost measure. Plausible assumptions are made under which he estimates 
the variance of measurement error in a way different from the Barth’s approach.  
There are limitations to these results. First, the analysis is confined to the 
balance sheet model, in which the theoretical coefficient for book value of an asset 
should be one. But the balance sheet does not report all net assets. Internally 
generated goodwill is specifically excluded from recognition in the accounts. The 
effect is one of omitted variables. This effect is known to cause bias in coefficients of 
included variables. Second, the studies require homogenous settings in their sample, 
with observations of similar size and from the same industry. The results may not be 
generalizable to a more heterogeneous setting.  
                                                 
23 Barth (1991) mentions the Gallant and Jorgenson (1979) chi-square statistic, which is used to 
test significance of the restrictions that measurement error variances are equal.  
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The other school of research uses more general methods to test measurement 
error. The non-nested model selection technique is employed. Dechow (1994) uses 
the income statement model to investigate the relative value-relevance of earnings 
and cash flows, where value is measured by stock returns. By using the non-nested 
model selection test of Vuong (1989), Dechow finds that residuals of the operating 
cash flow regression are larger in magnitude than those from the earnings regression. 
Since only one independent variable is employed each time, the regression’s residual 
error can be attributed to the measurement error in that independent variable. Hence, 
earnings appear to be more reliable than operating cash flows. Conditional on value 
relevance, this kind of model appropriateness test is accepted in the current value-
relevance studies as a way of analyzing measurement error. Jennings et al. (1998) 
investigates the effects of corporate restructurings on the usefulness of the balance 
sheet model. By using the Vuong test, they find more useful (reliable) information in 
the book values with restructuring adjustments than that without.  
The non-nested model methods are not flawless. If relevance varies across 
valuation models, a result attributed to reliability could be caused by changes in 
relevance. In multiple regression, residuals are determined by the fit of all 
independent variables. With several explanatory variables, the residuals cannot be 
attributed to measurement error of a particular independent variable.  
3.3 Asset write-down and earnings management research 
Many papers relate write-down issues with management opportunism. Rees et al. 
(1996) examine the extent to which discretionary write-offs are value-relevant rather 
than opportunistic. Unlike most prior studies, they do not equate earnings 
management with opportunistic behavior. Instead, they consider the possibility that 
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managers use this discretion to convey signals to investors. The authors find 
evidence that write-offs tend to occur contemporaneously with large income-
decreasing operating accruals. Further, Rees et al. examine the relation between 
earnings and returns for their sample by regressing the return variable on earnings 
per share, abnormal operating accruals per share, and per share effect of asset write-
down. The significantly positive coefficient on the abnormal operating accruals 
further strengthens the authors’ assumption that these accruals are not opportunistic. 
Elliott and Hanna (1996) use a comprehensive data set and innovative tests to 
document a decline in the information content of earnings for firms with multiple 
write-offs. They measure earnings information content in two ways: a nonparametric 
statistic to assess the abnormal price movement on the day of an information event, 
and an earnings response coefficient (ERC) test. The authors find that firms reporting 
a sequence of write-offs experience declining levels of earnings as the sequence 
lengthens. In other words, the poorer the performance is, the more frequently the 
firm writes off assets. The authors also find that information content of earnings 
declines for firms with frequent write-offs, as ERCs are lower when the frequency of 
write-offs increases.  
Francis et al. (1996) provide evidence on the causes and shareholder wealth 
effects of discretionary asset write-offs. They suggest that the absence of explicit 
guidance for many asset write-offs permit substantial management discretion as to 
amount and timing of asset write-offs. In order to test their hypotheses, the authors 
investigate the extent to which proxies for management manipulations and proxies 
for asset impairments explain write-off decisions. Proxies for asset impairment 
include stock market return, book-to-market ratios and ROA. They also include 
variables to proxy for the historical performance of the firm’s industry. Proxies for 
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manipulation include position changes in management, current year’s earnings, and 
other measures.24  A weighted tobit model is used to test the importance of the 
proxies on the asset write-off decision. They find that impairment proxies are 
significant in explaining asset write-offs, and the results are inconsistent with the 
predictions of big bath and incoming smoothing. An income statement model is 
employed to test shareholder wealth effects. The authors find significant negative 
reaction to the announcement of write-offs. They interpret this result as the investors’ 
responses being driven more by impairment perspectives than by a future 
performance perspective. 
Wilson (1996) suggests that future research should view write-off numbers as 
having three parts: a measurement construct component, a measurement error 
component, and a manipulation component. The first component is the unbiased 
amount assessed by experts, the second component captures the dispersion of these 
hypothetical measures from the consensus estimate, and the third component 
represents an intentional effort to misrepresent either for personal gain or for 
signaling. Obviously, measurement error research is prominent in the area of asset 
write-down.  
     
                                                 
24 They claim that management takes write-offs in periods that they experience an unusual income 
increase. However, it is true that management also could shift future earnings into the current period. 
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4 Research Design 
4.1. Value-relevance test 
The empirical investigation of value-relevance reported here is based on three 
conventional cross-sectional models.25  One is a balance sheet model in which I 
investigate the amount of write-down provisions; the second is an income statement 
model in which write-down gains and losses are investigated through their 
associations with capital market returns.26 Both the balance sheet model and income 
statement model are derived from the so called “capitalization model”.27 Additionally, 
I use a hybrid “price” model, derived from the “Feltham-Ohlson” model, that 
incorporates both assets and earnings in one model.  
4.1.1 Balance Sheet Model 
The incremental explanatory power of write-down provisions is assessed by 
estimating the relation between the market value of equity and the book value of 
equity. I calculate the market value of equity from its share price, adjusting any re-
issuance effects. The book value of equity is expressed as a combination of reported 
                                                 
25 Varieties of valuation models are discussed in Appendix A, part 1, where I discuss valuation 
theories and model interrelations.  
26 Researchers use numerous approaches to calculate the firm’s intrinsic values (Kothari 2001). 
Two mainstreams of valuation research are the capitalization model and the residual income model. 
Two perspectives exist in the capitalization model—the balance sheet and the income statement. The 
balance sheet model measures firm value as the cumulative effect of past operating results. The 
income statement model measures firm value by earnings capitalization. This model focuses on the 
expectation of future operating results.  
27 As Easton and Harris (1991) point out, the income statement model is just a first-difference 
form of the capitalization model. Assume only earnings and dividends affect stock holder’s equity, 
also known as the “clean surplus” condition. We can express the change of price Pt with the following 
equation:  ∆Pt = ∆Assett+ ∆Liabilityt = ∆Equityt = Et -dt, where assets, liabilities, and equity are 
measured on a per-share basis. Next, divide both sides by last year’s price Pt-1 and obtain the income 
statement model Rett= (∆Pt + dt)/Pt-1 = Et/Pt-1. By the same token, another form of income statement 
model can be derived from the earnings capitalization model, expressed as Rett=∆ Et/Pt-1 (Note Pt=Et 
in earnings capitalization model). Both income statement models (level and change) are used in 
existing papers. 
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assets and liabilities, as well as balances on write-down provisions.28 Annual and 
pooled linear regressions are developed. Because value-relevance of write-down 
estimates may differ across companies and years in my pooled regression, violating 
the homogeneity assumption of panel regression, I control both firm effects and year 
effects in the pooled regression.29  
The estimation equation is: 
it43210it         0    υααααα +++++= itititit PROVBVAHBVLBVAMVE         (1)     
where i and t denote firms and years; MVE is market value of common equity three 
months after the fiscal year-end when most firms have published their financial 
statements; BVA0 is book value of assets that are not affected by write-down 
regulations, namely, cash and cash receivable, prepayments and some other current 
and non-current assets; BVL is book value of liabilities; BVAC (not used in this 
equation) is book value of assets subject to write-down regulations as reported on the 
financial statement, while BVAH is the historical cost amount of those assets.30 
PROV is sum of write-down provisions. All variables are deflated by the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for stock splits and dividends to mitigate effects 
of heteroskedasticity. In the pooled regression, time and firm specific dummy 
variables are added to get a robust estimation, summarized in the constant term α0 in 
equation (1). Incremental explanatory power of write-down provisions will be 
observed if the amount is a value-relevant asset.  
                                                 
28 A similar balance sheet model can be found in, e.g., Landsman (1986). 
29 Known as fixed effect regression. Please see Appendix A, Part III, for a detailed discussion on 
methodologies of pooled sample regression. 
30 This number is not reported. It is computed by writing back the write-down provisions to 
BVAC. 
26 
A significant t-statistic on PROV in equation (1) will indicate that write-down 
provisions provide explanatory power incremental to historical costs (Barth, et al. 
1996). Auditors tend towards revaluing impaired assets down to reflect the fair 
values if management fail to do so, lessening book value of equities. This reasoning 
suggests that the write-down provision will most likely have a negative association 
with market value of equity. One the other hand, write-down provisions are 
discretionary accruals through which managements convey information to outsiders. 
For example, managers could signify future profitability through intensified write-
down activities before restructuring or after assigning new management, which could 
be treated positively by investors. Therefore, the coefficient on PROV could also be 
positive. Other asset variables are expected to attain positive coefficients and liability 
variables to be negative.  
4.1.2 Income Statement Model 
Analogously, gains and losses resulting from write-down activities are also 
investigated in one of the capitalization models, the income statement model. 
Reported earnings level, earnings change and write-down gains and losses are 
regressed on market returns. A 12-month holding return is calculated in this study. If 
the market is complete and perfect, the coefficient on permanent earnings would 
equal the reciprocal of the cost of capital, while those on transitory earnings would 
equal one.31 The coefficient should equal zero when the amount is not treated as 
                                                 
31 Miller and Modigliani (1966) only use earnings change as the dependant variable. Ohlson 
(1989) develops a model in which both earnings level and earnings change are relevant. Ohlson uses 
the symbol ρ to denote the identical theoretical coefficients for earnings level and earnings change, 
where ρ equals the reciprocal of the required return (ρ =1/r + 1), a constant coefficient across firms 
and time periods. Ohlson further shows that the theoretical coefficient for earnings change will be kρ 
while that for earnings level will be (1-k)ρ, k being the weight assigned between earnings change and 
level, if both level and change are used in the same equation. Easton and Harris (1991) report that, 
whereas in univariate regressions both level and change of earnings exhibit close relation with returns, 
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value-relevant (Easton 1999). Both earnings level and earnings change can explain 
market returns if earnings information is value-relevant. Existing papers use either 
one or both ones as explanatory variables.  
The estimation equation is: 
it3210          νββββ ++∆++= ithithitit WDGLEER  (2) 
where i and t denote firms and years respectively; R is the 12-month stock return 
ending three months after fiscal year-end, absorbing most accounting information 
after companies releasing financial statements; Eh is current earnings before any asset 
write-down adjustments—current or retrospective; ∆Eh is the change in Eh; WDGL is 
write-down gains or losses, and equals the changes of write-down provisions after a 
retrospective adjustment.32 All independent variables are deflated by the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for stock splits and dividends and by the last 
fiscal year’s ending share prices. 
Equation (2) permits assessing whether write-down gains and losses provide 
explanatory power in explaining stock returns beyond historical earnings and 
whether they are treated the same as ordinary gains and losses. If the WDGL are 
considered to be more subject to discretion, they should be less persistent and thus 
their coefficient, β3, should be relatively smaller than that of earnings level or 
earnings change. Reducing assets causes losses and writing back provisions creates 
gains. Writing back is prohibited by regulations in China but some companies still 
achieve writing provisions back to equity indirectly, e.g. assets swap. On the whole, 
the WDGL should appear as a loss in the pooled sample and therefore β3 should be 
                                                                                                                                          
in multivariate regression earnings level seems to dominate the whole equation, although the effect of 
earnings change still exists.  
32 Taking back the write-down provisions may generate income when, for example, an asset swap 
takes place between related companies. Though Chinese GAAP prohibits this kind of profit generated 
from non-arm’s length transactions, it is difficult to regulate.  
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negative in equation (2). Occasionally, managements write assets down to convey 
good news to investors, for example, excessive current year income. I do not exclude 
the possibility that investors treat these losses positively in valuing firms. Again, I 
control fixed effects in equation (2) when conducting pooled regressions.  
4.1.3 Price Model 
The price model examines the ability of write-down provisions and the related 
gains and losses to explain market equity values in one model. That is: 
it43210        ωγγγγγ +++++= ithitititit WDGLEPROVBVEHMVE    (3) 
where i and t denote firms and years; All the variables are described in equations (1) 
and (2) except BVEH, which is the book value of net assets prior to any write-down. 
I deflate all the variables in equation (3) with the adjusted outstanding shares and 
control the fixed effects in pooled regressions. 
4.2. Reliability Test  
As one of the criteria the FASB uses to choose accounting standards, reliability 
plays an important part in accounting research. Assume that the write-down 
provisions and the associated gains and losses are value-relevant in the research 
period. This does not necessarily imply that lower of cost or market accounting 
(LCM) is better for investors than historical cost accounting (HCA). LCM could 
have significantly lower reliability than HCA in that write-down estimations might 
be misrepresented intentionally or unintentionally. Reliable accounting numbers 
accurately reflect intrinsic values that market participants have assigned. Unreliable 
accounting numbers are evidenced by larger residuals in the valuation models, 
decreasing model explanatory power.  
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4.2.1. Non-nested Model Selection  
Both balance sheet and income information are accessible and important to 
various market participants in valuing a firm. Therefore, three valuation models will 
be used to test the relative reliability, interpreted as model appropriateness in this 
section, of HCA and LCM conventions: the balance sheet model, the income 
statement model, and the price model.  
Estimation equations for the balance sheet models are: 
ititititit BVAHBVLBVAMVE ηφφφφ        0    3210 ++++=    (4) 
ititititit BVACBVLBVAMVE '   '  '  0'  '  3210 ηφφφφ ++++=   (5)                          
where MVE, BVA0, BVL and BVAH are defined in equation (1). BVAC is reported 
amount of assets that are subject to asset write-down regulations. Equation (4) is the 
balance sheet model under HCA and equation (5) is the same model yet under LCM. 
The only difference between these two equations is that equation (4) drops the 
provision item from equation (1) while equation (5) absorbs it into an independent 
variable BVAC.  
Equations for the income statement models are: 
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where R, Eh and ∆Eh are defined in equation (2) and equation (3). Ec and ∆Ec are 
reported earnings level and earnings change under LCM. Therefore, equation (6) is a 
HCA model, while equation (7) is a LCM model.  
Equations (8) and (9) are price models under HCA and LCM respectively: 
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Note that the only difference between the two accounting conventions, namely 
LCM and HCA, is the amount of asset write-down provisions or related gains and 
losses. Because both accounting information from LCM and HCA are relevant to 
investors, the more reliable these estimates are, the more appropriate the accounting 
convention will be. Therefore, one could argue that an inferior LCM model is due to 
unreliable write-down estimates.  
Statistically, HCA and LCM models are non-nested. However, they are also not 
independent, because they share some values, i.e. some asset variable and liability 
variables. They are overlapping, non-nested models, and testing such models is 
difficult (see, e.g., Vuoug’s (1989) discussion). Because of the shared variables, it is 
often very hard to discriminate between the models. Three approaches will be used in 
this study.  
The first measure, adjusted R2 comparison, is used extensively in prior papers. 
For example, Dechow (1994) tests whether realized cash flow has a higher 
association (R2) with stock return than earnings, which is interpreted as more 
effectively summarizing firm performance. Similarly, adjusted R2s are compared 
between HCA regressions and LCM regressions. The equation with a higher R2 will 
be favored. This approach is reasonable for non-overlapping models using the same 
dependent variable. 
The second measure uses the J test, described, e.g., in Greene (2003 154f), is 
based on the “encompassing principle”. In test 1, let H0 (the null) be that HCA is the 
correct model, and let H1 (the alternative) be that LCM is the correct model. Obtain 
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the fitted values from the LCM model. Add these as independent variables in the 
(augmented) HCA model. If the coefficient on the fitted values in the HCA model is 
significant, H0 can be rejected—that is, LCM has explanatory power beyond HCA. If 
the coefficient is insignificant, H0 is accepted. Because definition of the hypotheses 
is arbitrary, the roles of HCA and LCM must be reversed for test 2. There are, in 
total, four possibilities for the J test. If both hypotheses are rejected, then neither 
model encompasses the other; if both hypotheses are accepted, then the data are not 
rich enough to distinguish the models; in the remaining two cases, one model or the 
other is superior, in the sense that it encompasses the other.  
The third measure, derived from the likelihood ratio test, is the Cox test. The 
Cox test is described, e.g., in Greene (2003 155f). The Cox test is based on the 
assumption of normally distributed errors in the competing regression models. 
Although the procedure is similar to the J test, the Cox test examines the increase in 
error variance in the augmented models. Because of its distributional assumptions, 
the Cox test is likely to be more powerful than the J test. However, because errors are 
only asymptotically normal in the models of this paper, the test is also less robust. 
Details of the J and Cox tests are discussed in Appendix B.  
4.2.2. Relative Measurement Error Research 
Apart from a mixed effect of relevance and reliability, the J and Cox tests could 
suffer a mixed effect of measurement errors. It is apparent that all independent 
variables contain measurement errors, generating a residual in a regression. 
Conclusions of any decreases in reliability recorded in the J test or Cox test could be 
a result of an increased variance and covariance structure of measurement errors, 
rather than an increased measurement error brought by write-down practice. Relative 
measurement error research is an alternative in testing reliability. Only the semi-log 
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balance sheet model and the semi-log income statement model are employed in this 
section, and I give up the price model because of weak theoretical support. A more 
extensive discussion of relative measurement error research is given in Appendix C.   
The balance sheet research is based on equations (4) and (5), the same equations 
as used for the model appropriateness tests. The main purpose here is to conclude 
whether LCM asset values contain less measurement error than HCA asset values, 
that is to say, whether BVAC contains smaller measurement error than that of BVAH, 
which is the only difference between equation (4) and equation (5). According to the 
relative measurement error research, measurement error in BVA0 and BVL also 
contributes to regression residuals and coefficient biases, so residual comparison is 
not proper if more than one independent variables are involved. Following the 
econometric setting outlined in Barth (1991), Choi et al. (1997), and Boone (2002), I 
estimate the variances of measurement error, σ2umvah (for BVAH) and σ2umvac (for 
BVAC), from an errors-in-variables two-stage regression (Appendix equation A-28). 
A larger variance implies a larger measurement error. The variance comparison is 
made by an F test in the seemingly unrelated settings.  
The two approaches employed in Barth (1991) and Boone (2002) have different 
assumptions regarding the variance and covariance structure, which is a critical issue 
in relative measurement error research. Boone (2002) argues that the covariances 
ignored by Barth (1991) in her computation might weaken her final conclusion. 
Boone (2002) specifies a compound statistical procedure beyond that of Barth’s 
(Appendix equation A-33). However, the method illustrated in Barth (1991) is direct 
and easy to implement (Appendix equation A-31). I employ both tests in this study, 
which might generate conflicting results. Consistent results would add credibility to 
the conclusion.  
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    Analogous to the balance sheet model, reported earnings also contain 
measurement error. I separate the earnings level (E) and earnings change (∆E) from 
both equations (6) and (7) into independent regressors, keeping only one independent 
variable each time. Under this setting, the magnitude of measurement error relates 
directly to the regression residual. A non-nested test proposed by Vuong (1989), is 
used to assess the magnitude of regression residual for earnings level income 
statement models and earnings change income statement models under both HCA 
and LCM conventions. A positive z-statistic implies that the residuals produced by 
the earnings from LCM convention are larger in magnitude than those from HCA 
convention. Hence, a positive and significant z-statistic indicates that HCA 
convention has less measurement error in terms of earnings level or earnings change. 
I discuss the Vuong test in Appendix B.       
4.3. Write-down Motivation Analysis 
I characterize write-down provisions as discretionary because limited 
authoritative guidance provides management with substantial flexibility in 
determining amounts of current and accumulated write-down. On the other hand, 
assets are also written down for economic reasons, for example, a loss in value. 
In exploring attributes of firms which affect the amount of write-downs, I 
identify both variables that capture impairment motivations and earnings 
manipulation motivations. All variables are calculated with no asset write-down 
effect, i.e. any present asset write-down provisions are added back to assets and 
related losses are added back to current earnings. A primary motive for asset write-
down (and the objective of the regulations) is the impairment of assets. The first 
proxy for impairment is market-to-book ratio (MTB). MTB equals market value of 
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equity divided by book value of equity, each measured at the fiscal year-end. I expect 
that firms with a decreasing MTB ratio (negative ∆MTB) are more likely to 
recognize impairment losses because the market has devalued their net assets. As a 
result, firms with relatively low MTB ratios should tend to have larger write-down 
provisions for economic reasons. Similarly, I predict that the firms with a below 
industry-average return on assets ratio (IAROA) are more likely to experience 
decreasing asset efficiency, thus they are more likely to record asset write-down.  
I also include variables to proxy for factors associated with managements’ 
incentives to take different amounts of asset write-down. The first such variable is 
financial distress (FD). FD is a dummy variable, with a value of one for firms 
classified as “ST” or “PT”. FD firms may be motivated either to avoid losses (no or 
limited impairment) or to take a big bath (excessive write-down) to avoid 
consecutive years of FD. Clearly, the amounts of current write-down are different for 
these two purposes. The second dummy variable is the auditor’s opinion (AO). AO 
proxies credibility of the financial statements. Auditors normally assign one of five 
opinions in China: clean, clean with explanation, qualified, adverse, and disclaimer. 
The AO variable is zero for a clean opinion (includes clean with explanation) and 
one otherwise. Most commonly, firms receive a clean opinion. Any other opinion 
signals reduced confidence in the financial statements on the part of the auditor. A 
possible source for this reduced confidence is management’s use of discretionary 
asset write-down. The third variable is current year’s earnings performance. On the 
one hand, if management is compensated with earnings-based bonus plans, and if 
pre-write-down earnings are already short of target, management has an incentive to 
shift future write-downs into the current year to improve the chance for future 
bonuses. This is a one form of the big bath hypothesis. However, it is common in 
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China for management positions to be linked with an earnings-based benchmark, and 
gross shortfall of the benchmark may result in dismissal. Managers in such a position 
are motivated to avoid huge losses. Facing a large loss, they may try to shift current 
write-down to later periods. Facing an adequate profit, on the other hand, they may 
increase discretionary accruals. This is one form of the income-smoothing hypothesis. 
To capture these varied effects, I define separate dummy variables for each. I define 
earnings performance as abnormally good (GOOD) if industry-adjusted ROE is in 
the top 10 percentile, measured prior to any current write-down amounts. I define 
earnings performance as abnormally poor (POOR) if industry-adjusted ROE is in the 
bottom 10 Percentile. The last non-economic dummy variable is TURN, defined as 
the possibility to turn profitable by earnings manipulation. Companies with small 
losses in the range of zero to negative ¥0.1 per share are classified into this category.   
Finally, I include a measure of firm size (SIZE), defined as the log of total 
assets per share preceding write-downs. I also include a measure of leverage (LEV), 
defined as total liabilities divided by total assets. Size and leverage of the firm are 
general control variables. I do not propose any a priori linkage between these 
variables and asset write-down, but it is reasonable to assume that the market could 
treat write-down differentially based on these fundamental financial characteristics.  
The multivariate analysis is performed on the current write-down ratio 
(RDIFPROV), defined as the current write-down amount divided by the related 
assets subject to write-down (at unadjusted cost), and also on the accumulated write-
down ratio (RPROV), defined as the write-down provision divided by the related 
assets subject to write-down. The regressions are: 
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5. Sample Selection and Data Description 
5.1. Sample Selection 
The sample consists of firms listed on the Shanghai Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2001—the period covering the accounting reform and 
the related asset write-down regulations.33 Financial data and stock market data are 
mainly collected from the TEJ (Taiwan Economy Journal) database. Due to 
limitations in this database, additional data are collected from annual statements.  
There are 851 listed companies in the whole market in 1998, and this number 
increased to 1160 at the end of 2001. Companies were not included in this research 
unless they met all the following criteria: 
1. annual earnings, book value, and share information are available on the 2001 
Taiwan Economic Journal Database, supplemented by official stock 
information obtained from the website of the CSRC; 
2. firms issuing B or H shares are excluded, in order to remove the potential 
impact of foreign investors; 
3. the firm is listed before 1997, in order to eliminate any IPO effect;34 
                                                 
33  This four-year period also witnessed a prosperous economy in China. For example, the 
Shanghai stock market index increased from 1194 in January 1998 to 2230 in June 2001, which is also 
its historical high. After that, the market declined and the index has not reached this level again (as of 
early 2003).  
34 IPO packaging is particularly an issue in China, where the stock market is the most precious 
money resource (Aharony, et al. 2000) 
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4. firm financial and market data must be available for each year in the period. 
[Table 2 here] 
These filters produced a sample of 320 firms that survived through the 4-year 
period, forming a balanced panel of 1280 firm-year observations. Panel data make it 
possible to control for both cross-sectional and time-series effects, producing more 
reliable coefficient estimates.35 Table 2 summarizes sample selection results. Panel A 
shows the relative scale of the selected sample by listed locations and share types. 
The sample consists of 31.6% of the existing firm-year observations. There are 
marginally more firms in Shanghai market than that in Shenzhen market, and cover 
percentages in both markets are similar. The sample also covers 36.3% of the A 
shares in the whole market. Panel B presents the sample firms by industry. 320 firms 
are categorized into 9 main industries according to GICS (Global Industry 
Classification Standard). The highest sample intensity is the consumer discretionary 
industry, constituting 25.3% of the sample. The financial industry takes up a 
percentage of 10.3%, all being real estate companies and not banks.  
Table 3 presents evidence on industry differences in asset write-down practice. 
The number of industries is reduced to seven after merging some industries.36 PROV 
is accumulated write-down ratio and equals the provision scaled by the related asset 
                                                 
35 This is one of the many reasons that panel data models are popular in accounting research. A 
pooled regression in this study without any year or firm controls may not provide precise estimations, 
while a fixed effects or a random effects pooled regression may. The fixed effects regression model 
corrects the omitted variable problem in an uncontrolled regression by incorporating firm-specific 
and/or year-specific effects. The disadvantage of fixed effects regression is that the model contains a 
large number of constant terms. The random effects regression model disaggregates the random error 
term in an ordinary pooled regression into firm-specific and/or year-specific components thus 
avoiding numerous constant terms. The sample in this paper does not represent a random sample of 
listed firms, and, thus, a priori, I would expect the fixed effects to be more appropriate. Nevertheless, 
because the random effects model is more parsimonious, it was considered (and rejected ) for this 
research (see Appendix A for details). 
36 I combine the energy industry with the basic material industry and the consumer staple industry 
with the consumer discretionary industry.  
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value before write-down. ∆PROV is current write-down amount scaled by the related 
asset value. Both PROV and ∆PROV are presented with their four-year-average 
values. Seven assets are displayed horizontally and eight industries vertically. 
Because asset write-down is not large relative to asset value, the mean and median 
ratios for both PROV and ∆PROV are small. Both means and medians for the 
accounts receivable provision (PROV1) are well over 1% for all industries except 
utilities and are much larger than those for intangible assets (PROV5), construction 
in progress (PROV6), and commission loans (PROV7), which are recently required 
in AR2001. The means and medians in ∆PROV have the same pattern. The summary 
column for PROV (TOTAL PROV) shows that industry 1 (Oil, Gas and Material) 
and industry 7 (Utilities) have relatively low accumulated write-down provision 
ratios. These two industries are characterized by higher quality (i.e. low risk) assets. 
Industry 5 (Financial), on the other hand, has relatively high ratios for PROV, which 
may be due to lower quality (i.e. higher risk) assets, such as investments in real estate 
development and consumer loans. The summary column for ∆PROV (TOTAL 
∆PROV) shows that average current write-down ratio is high in industry 4 (Health 
Care) and industry 6 (Information Technology). It is possible that negative write-
down amounts are offset by positive write-backs in industry 5 (Financial), because 
the current write-down ratio is lower than expected. This could indicate manipulation 
of the financial result. The last column presents mean total assets for these industries. 
Utility firms are relatively big (¥2697 million) while information technology firms 
are the smallest (¥999 million). The absolute amount of total assets probably 
suggests asset quality because utilities is the biggest, but least impaired, industry.       
[Table 3 here] 
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5.2. Descriptive statistics   
Descriptive statistics for the value-relevance regression variables are given in 
Table 4. To control for the effects of extreme values, each variable is ranked 
separately and winsorized by 1% on both ends. This maintains sample size while 
minimizing the impact of extreme values. Smaller variances are observed in the 
winsorized annual data descriptions (not reported in Table 4) with modest changes in 
mean values, which suggests that the influence of extreme values has been 
effectively reduced.37 Both the original numbers and the winsorized numbers are 
reported in table 4. The following analysis is based on the winsorized data. 
[Table 4 here] 
The average per share market value of equity (MVE) is ¥10.92, with an annual 
mean standard deviation of ¥2.77. Investors obtained an average annual 25.2% total 
market return during this four-year period with an annual mean standard deviation of 
43.7%. These two descriptions exhibit a quite unsettled market in China. For the 
balance sheet amounts, the asset write-down provision (PROV) achieves a mean of 
¥0.176 per share with a standard deviation of ¥0.119, roughly a 4.9% reduction in the 
related assets.38 The provision creates differences between HCA and LCM asset 
valuations. For the gain and loss amounts, the mean of annual earnings per share 
before asset write-down (Eh ) is ¥0.110 and declines during the period, with the mean 
of average earning change (∆Eh ) being –¥0.025. The asset write-down practice 
results in a ¥0.025 per share loss (WDGL) and makes LCM earnings (Ec) lower than 
HCA earnings (Eh). However, there are write-down gains (WDGL) if managers 
                                                 
37 The variances reported in Table 4 are variances of annual mean statistics and thus are not 
subject to the variance-minimizing effect of the winsorizing procedure.     
38 I record PROV in positive numbers.  
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revise their earlier estimations and take the provisions back. The result is that LCM 
could generate higher earnings. The deteriorating profitability of these firms further 
strengthens arguments that Chinese listed companies are “over-dressed” when 
initially listed. 
6. Empirical Results  
6.1. Explanatory power of write-down provisions and related gains and 
losses 
Table 5 presents regression summary of equation (1). The balance sheet model 
is in semi-log form with equity market value (MVE) being in log form.39 Panel A 
reports statistics from two fixed effects regressions. The first row reports results of 
the four-year fixed effects regression, including 1998, the voluntary write-down year. 
The adjusted R-square is 70.0% and all the coefficients estimated are significant at 
the 0.05 level except the coefficient on book value of liabilities (BVL). The 
coefficient for asset write-down provisions is –0.275 (t= -7.092) and much more 
significant than that for other assets. The three-year fixed effects regression results 
are reported below, where I drop the year 1998 to investigate the pure effect of 
mandatory write-down. The regression shows a 68.10% adjusted R-square, almost 
unchanged from the 4-year fixed effect model despite losing 320 observations. All 
the estimates are significant at the 0.05 level and the coefficient for asset write-down 
provisions is –0.214 (t= -4.426), which is the most significant. The evidence is clear 
that the asset write-down provision has incremental power in the balance sheet model. 
However, the coefficients for asset write-down provisions are much bigger than 
those for assets and liabilities, which is unexpected. Recalling that coefficients in the 
                                                 
39  Semi-log transformation is used to counter the effect from model misspecification. All 
valuation models are in their semi-log forms in this study. Please see Appendix A, part 2 for details.  
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semi-log model are partial elasticities, the -0.275 coefficient on provisions in the 
four-year model means that a ¥1 per share increase in provisions reduces per share 
market equity by 27.5 percent. A similar increase in other liabilities reduces per share 
market equity by only 3.3 percent (8.0 percent in the three-year model). 
[Table 5 here] 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the annual regression estimates for equation (1). 
The explanatory power of the annual regressions is relatively low.40 The adjusted R-
square in the 1999 regression is only 1.5%. This may be a reflection of the 
uncertainty introduced by the onset of mandatory write-downs. There is an 
insignificantly positive coefficient, α4, for PROV in 1998 while the coefficients 
subsequently turn negative. This suggests that some investors treated voluntary asset 
write-down as a good news signal—either of the quality of management or of the 
possibility for increased future earnings. α4 turns negative in 1999 and becomes 
significantly negative thereafter. With fixed firms in my panel sample, the annual 
results for the coefficient on provisions suggest the possibility of some learning 
effect by investors or delayed market response. After four years of experience with 
the provisions, investors act as if they believe provisions are bad news. 
The findings from Table 5 indicate that the write-down provisions are value-
relevant to investors, and these provisions provide more information content to 
investors than other assets and liabilities. Value-relevance, however, does not imply 
more efficient pricing. Value-relevance could be achieved at the cost of decreased 
reliability. The result, therefore, should be treated as tentative.  
                                                 
40 The lack of power of the annual regressions reflects the volatility of the Chinese market and the 
effects of accounting reforms during this period. The panel regression overcomes much of this 
volatility by estimating annual effects. 
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Table 6 presents regression summaries of equation (2), the semi-log form of 
income statement model. Panel A reports the estimates from fixed effects regressions 
and Panel B reports annual ones. First I report the four-year fixed effects regression. 
The adjusted R-square is 55.6%, which is quite powerful for an income statement 
model. Consistent with Easton et al. (1993), significantly positive coefficients are 
recorded on both earnings level (Eh) and earnings change (△Eh) variables. However, 
the coefficient for write-down gains and losses (WDGL) is –0.420 (t= -0.819), which 
is not significant at the conventional level and suggests a transitory loss. The three-
year fixed effect regression yields similar results except for a higher adjusted R-
square and a significantly negative WDGL coefficient. The magnitude of the WDGL 
coefficient, however, is lower than that on earnings level. A possible explanation is 
that these write-down losses might not be as permanent as other gains or losses 
generated from operations and thus are capitalized at a lower rate. Generally 
speaking, the mandatory write-down regression yields evidence that WDGL is value-
relevant in the income statement model.  
[Table 6 here] 
Panel B of Table 6 presents annual regression estimates for equation (2). The 
explanatory power of the annual regressions is relatively low compared with that in 
the fixed effect regressions, but is, even with fewer independent variables, somewhat 
better than those in the annual balance sheet model regressions, indicating the 
possibility that the Chinese equity market is more “earnings-driven” than “assets-
driven”. Earnings change variables are significant in 3 years while those for level are 
significant in 2 years. I record a significantly positive coefficient for WDGL in 1998 
while all are negative in following periods, which suggests that some voluntary 
write-down practices are actually signals conveying good news to the investors. For 
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example, the management could demonstrate their conservatism to lenders by 
devaluing assets and reducing earnings. Together with the result from the balance 
sheet model, there is evidence that the market is rewarding the early adopters or 
equivalently, punishing firms who hide losses by not reporting asset impairments. 
The mandatory regulations, however, causes write-down practices to become routine 
and diminishes the signaling effect of WDGL, as we see from the increasing 
permanence in WDGL. 
The findings from Table 6 indicate that write-down practice is value-relevant to 
investors in terms of its gains and losses, but the information content of write-downs 
is lower than that of HCA earnings. Again I find that the effect of voluntary write-
down practice 1998 is different from that of mandatory write-down in later years, 
which is subject to less discretion. The noise in these gains and losses could lead 
them to be viewed as transitory, as can be observed from their small coefficients. 
Retrospective adjustments taken in 1999 and 2001 are especially likely to contain 
measurement error. Therefore, the unreliability of these write-down gains and losses 
could offset their relevance.  
[Table 7 here] 
Table 7 represents the regression results from the semi-log form of price model, 
which captures information from both balance sheets and income statements. Panel 
A reports the combined assets and earnings outcome in the fixed effects regressions. 
The explanatory power of the price model is higher than either the balance sheet 
model or the income statement model, related R-squares are 73.4% for the four-year 
regression and 70.8% for the three-year regression. Coefficients on earnings level (Eh) 
in both regressions are positive and the ones on write-down gains and losses (WDGL) 
are negative, with the latter variables being less significant. These results are similar 
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to those in income statement models. I am surprised in finding insignificant 
coefficients for book value of net asset (BVEH) and write-down provision (PROV) 
in these fixed effect regressions. Income statement information is clearly dominating 
balance sheet information in market valuation in China. Panel B of Table 7 shows 
that coefficients on earnings are all significant with the predicted signs, while the 
coefficients on provisions are insignificant or only marginally significant. The 
marginally significant coefficient is positive, implying an increase in market equity if 
provisions increase—a counter-intuitive result. A high level of provisions may have 
been associated with higher expected future return on assets. But the association is 
not too strong and did not persist in subsequent periods.  
The price model tests give a weighted test for write-down provisions and related 
gains and losses together. The results show evidence that write-down gains and 
losses are incrementally value-relevant while the write-down provisions are 
insignificantly value-relevant. These results, however, do not suggest that the 
provisions are not value-relevant. Instead, it points up that the earnings information 
might be more important in the valuation processes.  
In general, the results presented in 6.1 show evidence that asset write-down 
practice is value-relevant, providing incremental information beyond historical 
numbers. The voluntary write down imposes different effects on its value-relevance 
due to either learning effects or signal effects. However, it does not change the 
overall results when the observations are pooled. Finally, earnings have priority over 
assets in valuation processes. In the light of the relevance and reliability theory, asset 
write-down accounting, although relevant, could cause decreased reliability. The 
next part of paper is devoted to the reliability analysis.  
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6.2. The Reliability of Write-down Provisions and Related Gains and 
Losses 
Table 8 reports comparative results based on three valuation models. All these 
tests are based on the semi-log fixed effects panel regressions. Panel A shows results 
from the balance sheet model. HCA model, equation (4) and LCM model, equation 
(5) are regressed independently. LCM model generates marginally higher adjusted R-
squares in both fixed effects regressions, with the difference less than 1 percent. In 
the four-year regression, the J test rejects both null hypotheses in test 1 (t=5.978) and 
test 2 (t=-4.290), the Cox test rejects both also (t=-30.156 for test 1 and t=9.288 for 
test 2). However, test 1 generates more significant t values in both J and Cox tests, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that HCA is appropriate more strongly. The three-year 
regression shows similar ambiguous results (t=-15.451 for test 1 and t=5.134 for test 
2) in the Cox test. The J test, however, rejects HCA but does not reject LCM 
(t=3.864 for test 1 and t=-1.916 for test 2), indicating that LCM is the appropriate 
model. In sum, results are ambiguous in balance sheet comparisons: weak evidence 
is shown that the LCM is more appropriate in the four-year period which includes the 
voluntary write-down year 1998; these results, however, show stronger, but not 
conclusive, evidence that LCM is more appropriate in the three-year mandatory 
write-down period.  
[Table 8 here] 
Panel B of Table 8 reports results from the income statement model. Both 
equations, equation (6) and equation (7), are regressed independently. LCM model 
generates marginally smaller adjusted R-squares in both fixed effects regressions, 
with the difference less than 1 percent. Both J test and Cox test reject the null 
hypotheses in test 2 and accept the null hypotheses in test 1 in the four-year 
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regression, significantly indicating that HCA is appropriate in this setting. Results are 
ambiguous in the three-year regression, where the J test and Cox test generate close t 
values for both test 1 and test 2 (for J, t=2.388 for test 1 and t=2.717 for test 2; for 
Cox, t=-3.919 for test 1 and t=-4.648 for test 2). However, test 2 yields larger t 
values. In sum, the income statement model comparisons show strong evidence that 
HCA is more appropriate in the four-year period. In the three-year mandatory write-
down period, however, the models are essentially comparable. 
Panel C of Table 8 reports marginally higher R-squares in LCM regressions. 
The J test and Cox test reject the null of both tests in both regressions. In all cases, 
the HCA model can be rejected at a lower level than LCM model, with rather larger 
differences in the three-year regressions. In sum, results here provide weak evidence 
in favor of LCM. This is perhaps somewhat surprising given the results for the 
income statement model and given that earnings dominated equity in the price model. 
Model appropriateness tests, in brief, show some evidence that balance sheet 
amounts are more reliable under LCM convention, especially after the enforcement 
of mandatory regulations. The tests, however, show modest evidence that earnings 
amounts are less reliable under LCM convention, and it is clear that the voluntary 
write-down brings unreliable estimates into earnings amounts. If both assets and 
earnings are considered, the results are ambiguous but still there is weak evidence 
that the LCM convention is more reliable.  
Table 9 reports additional reliability evidence from the relative measurement 
error research. Panel A shows the relative magnitudes of measurement error 
variances for BVAC after subtracting the measurement error variances for BVAH. 
The Barth (1991) approach generates significant positive values in both four-year 
and three-year regression, indicating bigger measurement error variances under the 
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LCM convention. A bigger measurement error variance, in term, indicates a larger 
measurement error. The Boone (2002) approach also generates significant positive 
values in both regressions, showing that the LCM convention contains no less 
measurement error than the HCA convention. Panel B of Table 9 shows reliability 
evidence from income statement models. None of the z values are significant, but the 
direction of the values favors LCM in the mandatory write-down period and HCA in 
the four-year period.  
[Table 9 here] 
In general, the reliability tests present ambiguous evidence as to whether the 
write-down practice has improved the reliability of accounting information or not. 
The non-nested approach shows weak evidence that LCM contains less measurement 
error in the balance sheet, while the relative measurement error test comes to an 
opposite conclusion. Most likely, the magnitude of measurement error in the balance 
sheet remains unchanged after write-down. There is stronger evidence that voluntary 
write-down practice brings more measurement error with respects to earnings, which 
is supported in both non-nested and relative measurement error tests. This earnings 
effect, however, is not clear in the mandatory period.           
6.3. Write-down Motivation Analysis 
Panel A of table 10 reports mean and standard deviation values for the variables 
in equations (10) and (11). The mean for firm size (SIZE) is 1.40, which is the log 
form of per share total assets. The mean for leverage is 48.5%. The sample firms 
have an average market-to-book ratio (MTB) of 5.48, with a 0.32 increase (∆MTB) 
in sample period. A standard deviation of 7.95, however, suggests the market’s 
unsettled situation. 7.7% of the total sample firms receive qualified auditor’s 
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opinions (AO) and 5.2% have experienced financial distress (FD). As to their 
performance, the average industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA) is 0.0% by 
construction (mean-adjusted value). Also by construction, 10% of the sample firms 
are in the good performance portfolio (GOOD), and another 10% are in the poor 
performance portfolio (BAD). 6.8% of the firms have marginal losses (TURN). 
Finally, the description reports an average 1.8% current write-down ratio (RDIF) and 
an average 4.5% accumulated write-down ratio (RPROV). Panel B presents the 
correlation matrix for the regression variables. None of the variables are highly 
correlated with each other in either Spearman or Pearson tests. The strongest relation 
is that between LEV and SIZE (0.43).  
[Table 10 here] 
The multivariate analysis for equation (10) is shown in panel C, which presents 
numerical relations between different motivations and present asset write-down 
ratios. The pooled sample regressions show R-squares of 14.6% and 13.9% for the 
four-year sample and three-year sample respectively. The proxy for impairment 
motivation, △MTB, has significant negative coefficients in both four-year and three-
year regressions, supporting my prediction that firms with declining market-to-book 
ratio incur more current write-down. Another proxy in this category, IAROA, also 
has significant negative coefficients in both regressions. It suggests that below-
average IAROA can also trigger write-downs. Proxies for discretionary motivations 
are all significant in both regressions except for POOR. The positive coefficients for 
AO suggest that current write-down amounts have a positive relation with the 
incidence of qualified auditor’s opinions, which partially represent the quality of 
financial reports. This in turn suggests that large amounts of current write-down 
might contain some discretionary motivations. The negative coefficients for FD 
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suggest that firms write down less if they are in financial distress. The good 
performance portfolio (GOOD) yields significantly positive coefficients in both 
regressions, supporting the possibilities of income-smoothing. The poor performance 
portfolio, however, does not show any relation with current write-down amounts. A 
possible explanation is that some firms with severe losses take big baths while others 
minimize their deficits, diversified strategies leading to an insignificant result on the 
whole. As expected, the TURN variable yields significantly negative coefficients in 
both regressions, showing management motivation to avoid write-down losses or to 
record write-back gains when the firm result, before write-down, is a modest loss. 
The control variable LEV is significantly positive in both regressions while the 
control variable SIZE is not significant. These results suggest that high leverage is 
associated with high current write-down, which is contrary to conventional 
contracting theory. The annual regression results, listed in the right columns, report 
few significant variables because the motivations are better captured in a relatively 
long period rather than in a year. The AO, GOOD and TURN variables are 
significant in most of the annual regressions with the predicted signs, exhibiting 
strong discretionary motivations in current write-down amounts. The POOR variable, 
however, shows different signs among the four years, reflecting the diversified 
strategies among the poor performance portfolio. 
The current write-down ratio measures annual effects. Panel D of Table 10 
presents the multivariate analysis for accumulated write-down provisions ratios. The 
accumulated write-down ratio captures multi-period effects. Both three-year and 
four-year fixed effect regressions yield high adjusted R-squares of 63.11% and 
72.32%, respectively. The panel reveals some results that are interesting vis-à-vis the 
results in panel C for the current write-down ratio. In particular, the result for FD is 
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significantly positive compared to a significantly negative result for current write-
downs. The result suggests that FD (like GOOD firms) engage in smoothing of their 
write-down losses, but they do not avoid large provisions over the test period. GOOD, 
on the other hand, is significantly negative compared to a significantly positive result 
for current write-downs. The result suggests that good firms engage in smoothing 
only infrequently, but that they do not (or cannot) build up large provisions. The sign 
on the coefficient for POOR is positive and opposite that of its sign for current write-
downs, paralleling the behavior of the GOOD variable. But the coefficient remains 
insignificant. This is somewhat surprising, because both big bath and smoothing 
strategies for POOR firms should lead to higher provisions. The result suggests that 
POOR firms have been successful in avoiding cumulatively large write-downs over 
the test period. The TURN variable remains significantly negative. This is even 
stronger evidence that some firms with poor performance have avoided cumulatively 
large write-downs. These results could be a point of concern for regulators in the 
Chinese market. The control variable LEV yields a similar result as it does in the 
previous regression. SIZE goes from insignificantly negative for current write-downs 
to significantly negative for accumulated write-down provisions, indicating that these 
firms have persistently low write-downs. The largest firms in the sample are utilities 
with relatively high-quality assets. However, utilities are only 5 percent of the 
sample. It is possible that firm size and asset quality are positively related in other 
industries in China. But the result raises the possibility that large firms have more 
political power and use that power to avoid large write-downs. 
In general, the empirical evidence presented above supports my prediction that 
both impairment motivations and discretionary motivations can lead to asset write-
down, currently and cumulatively. Stronger relations are found between asset write-
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down practice and discretionary motivations. Over and under provisions are related 
with the diversified goals of earnings management. There is evidence that large firms 
and poorly performing firms are able to avoid large provisions.  
7. Further Analysis 
Some professional papers attack the practice of periodically excessive write-
downs, which they consider unethical.41 An excessive write-down could either be a 
result of unexpected asset impairment or be a convenient way to manipulate earnings. 
Many recent accounting scandals in China involve excessive asset write-down or 
excessive asset “write-up”. 42  This section provides tests for the hypotheses that 
excessive asset write-down might involve discretionary manipulations and thereby 
reduce the reliability of LCM values.  
I begin by estimating the degree of asset write-down (including write-back), 
using the absolute amounts of asset write-down ratios.43 I rank these ratios annually 
and pick out the top 20% firms as excessive write-down firms. Excessive write-down 
can have multiple year effects on a firm’s performance; for example, a large write-
down can reduce losses for several subsequent years. Therefore, firms are 
categorized into the excessive write-down sample (HIGH) if they take an excessive 
write-down at least once in the sample period. Otherwise, they are classified as 
normal write-down firms (LOW).  
[Table 11 here] 
                                                 
41 Case study: Shanxi Fenjiu (listed code 600809), decreasing bad debt allowances and increasing 
earnings. China Securities (12/04/2001). 
42 Write-up here means taking back the provisions and recovering the impaired assets.  
43 Asset write-back ratio is negative. After taking absolute value, this ratio becomes positive. 
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Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics for both HIGH sample and LOW 
sample. Panel A reports the composition of the HIGH sample. 166 firms are picked 
as the aggressive firms that write down assets excessively, leaving 154 firms in the 
opposite sample. Particularly, 70.6% of the information technology firms are in the 
HIGH sample while the ratio is only 20.0% for utilities firms, which is attributed to 
different industry characteristics: a conservative industry like utilities seldom adopts 
aggressive accounting policies while a liberal industry like IT often adopts 
aggressive policies. A two-way chi-squared statistic (14.52) rejects the hypothesis 
that HIGH sample firms are evenly distributed among industries.  
Panel B of Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics of the two sub-samples. I 
use the t test of means and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test of medians to assess 
statistical differences between the HIGH sample firms and LOW sample firms, 
where firm performance, discretionary motivations and other controlling factors are 
compared. Because the underlying distributions of the variables are not normal, the 
Wilcoxon test may be more powerful than the t test. The accumulated provision ratio 
(RPROV) shows statistical differences in mean and median with a t value of –15.078 
and a z value of –14.150. This shows that the behavior of excessive write-down 
generally results in relatively more provisions in the accounts. Next, I find that these 
two sub-samples have significantly different ROA, IAROA and MTB ratios. The 
HIGH sample firms have smaller ROAs as well IAROAs while achieving larger 
MTB ratios. Lower IAROA implies under-performing assets for HIGH firms. Such 
assets are more likely to be impaired. This result supports non-discretionary 
motivation for write-downs. On the contrary, significantly higher MTB ratios as well 
as insignificantly higher ∆MTB in the HIGH sample present controversial evidence 
against the economic motivation hypothesis. Under the economic motivation, it 
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should be the LOW sample which has lower MTB ratios and experiences greater 
declines in MTB. The adjusted return (R) is not significantly different between the 
two sub-samples, although returns to LOW firms are higher than those to HIGH 
firms. This again supports non-discretionary motivations for write-down; otherwise, 
investors could discriminate between these sub-samples in terms of risk. Although 
HIGH and LOW firms are not significantly different in size, they do differ in 
leverage. HIGH firms are significantly more levered than LOW firms. The results of 
Table 10 already show that leverage is significantly positively associated with write-
downs, both current and cumulative. High leverage firms may be subject to more 
scrutiny by their creditors (outsiders) than low leverage firms. 
Discretionary motivations, however, are more pronounced. The mean and 
median tests show significant values for all the discretionary-motivation variables. 
The HIGH sample firms are 4 times more likely to receive qualified auditor’s 
opinions and 6 times more likely to experience financial distress. Also, the likelihood 
for their presence in the POOR and TURN portfolios is much higher than those for 
the LOW sample firms. On the contrary, HIGH sample firms are less likely to 
achieve GOOD status as one of the top 10 percent performers in any year.44  
In sum, the descriptive statistics show evidence that “excessive” asset write-
down is related to both asset impairment and to discretionary motivations. One 
revealing aspect is that the excessive write-down practice exhibits more discretionary 
motivations that may involve earnings manipulation. 
[Table 12 here] 
                                                 
44 Although I record a positive relation between current write-down ratio and GOOD in Table 10, 
this relation was negative for the accumulated write-down ratio, indicating that GOOD firms 
accumulated relatively low provisions. Excessive write-down firms are in the top 20 percent of write-
downs in at least 1 year, and it is likely that GOOD firms never record such high annual write-downs.     
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Table 12 presents the non-nested model selection results for the two sub-
samples, HIGH and LOW. Panel A presents the results from the balance sheet model 
comparisons. Neither J nor Cox tests can distinguish the two accounting conventions 
in the LOW sample, where the write-down amounts are normal. Both test 1 and test 2 
either jointly reject or jointly accept, leaving an ambiguous result. For the HIGH 
sample, however, the qualitative results favor the LCM model for both Cox and J 
tests. In the three-year period model, the J test rejects the null in test 1 and does not 
reject in test 2, supporting LCM as the appropriate model in the three-year period. 
Together with other evidence such as marginally improved R-squares, the LCM 
model shows a slight priority over HCA in terms of reliability.  
Panel B of Table 12 presents the results from the income statement model 
comparisons. The LOW sample sees a small improvement in the R-squares under 
write-down accounting. Moreover, the null hypothesis that HCA is appropriate is 
rejected in both J and Cox tests in both regressions, while in the symmetric test the 
null hypothesis that LCM is appropriate is not rejected in both J and Cox tests in both 
regressions. Evidence is clear that LCM improves the reliability in the LOW sample. 
The HIGH sample reports different results for the four- and three-year models. The 
results tend to favor HCA for the four-year model, but LCM for the three-year model. 
There is weak evidence that mandatory asset write-down could improve the 
reliability of earnings information while the voluntary write-down, on the contrary, 
obviously decreases reliability.   
Panel C of Table 12 tests the of the price model, which includes both assets and 
earnings. As previously seen in Table 7, net earnings dominate net assets in this 
model. Because of this, the price model can be expected to yield similar results to 
those reported in panel B. The J test and Cox test strongly support the claim that 
55 
LCM is more appropriate in the LOW sample. The results are ambiguous in HIGH 
sample apparently due to the possible unreliability of voluntary write-down in the 
first year of the period. Nevertheless, the results qualitatively support LCM even for 
the HIGH sample. In the three-year model, the J test rejects HCA but cannot reject 
LCM as the appropriate model. 
Additional reliability tests using the relative measurement error approach shows 
growing dichotomy between the two sub-samples. Panel A of Table 13 reports the 
measurement error tests for both LOW and HIGH sample. Both Barth (1991) and 
Boone (2002) approaches generate significant negative values, which are strong 
evidence that LCM contains less measurement error than HCA. The HIGH sample 
reports significant positive values under both approaches, indicating a possible 
increased measurement error in LCM convention. Results from four-year and three-
year regressions are consistent. Note that the non-nested test favors LCM slightly in 
HIGH sample, which is contrary to the result found here. The difference may come 
from different assumptions on which non-nested and relative measurement error tests 
are built. Nevertheless, both results in the HIGH sample are not conclusive, which 
implies that the measurement error or reliability could remain unchanged in the 
HIGH sample. Panel B reports the measurement error tests from the income 
statement models. The LOW sample experiences a small improvement in terms of 
reliability, as suggested by the negative Vuong’s z values. This improvement, 
however, is not statistically significant. Although the HIGH sample also reports 
insignificant negative z values in the four-year regression, it reports insignificant 
positive z values in the three-year regression, which show qualitative evidence that 
voluntary write-down can bring more measurement error in earnings. This finding is 
consistent with the results from J and Cox tests.  
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[Table 13 here] 
In general, the sub-sample reliability analysis shows that periodically excessive 
write-down may reduce the reliability of earnings information, especially in the 
voluntary write-down period. Conversely, non-aggressive write-down practice, 
which involves less discretionary motivation, appears to increase the reliability of 
financial information in both assets and earnings. Evidence of decreased reliability in 
excessive write-down sample, however, is not significant, which suggests some 
effect from non-discretionary motivations. 
  
8. Conclusion 
The objectives of this study are to identify value-relevance characteristics of 
asset write-down regulations enforced in the recent accounting reform. Both 
reliability and motivation issues are empirically investigated in this study. There are 
in total 320 Chinese exchange-listed companies covering a four-year research period 
(1998-2001) in the sample.  
The study shows that provisions and associated gains and losses of asset write-
down accounting are priced by the stock market. This result is consistent with the 
findings of prior value-relevance research. The study also shows that voluntary 
write-down practice may contain either signaling or learning effects, leading to a 
value-relevance effect that is opposite that of mandatory write-down practice. 
It is possible that LCM numbers, although value-relevant, are measured with 
greater error than HCA numbers, leading to a loss of reliability. This possibility is 
investigated using non-nested model comparisons (J and Cox tests) together with 
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relative measurement error tests. Results for the balance sheet model qualitatively 
support LCM as the better model in the J and Cox tests, while the relative 
measurement error tests show that LCM contains no less measurement error than that 
from HCA. Results from both approaches for the income statement model 
qualitatively support HCA as the better model. In particular, HCA is weakly 
supported as the superior model for the four-year period including the voluntary 
write-down year of 1998. In the price model (which combines return and asset 
variables), the results from J and Cox tests qualitatively support LCM. There is 
evidence that voluntary LCM practice decreased reliability of reported earnings, but 
there is no evidence that mandatory LCM practice has decreased reliability of net 
earnings or net assets in China. 
A potential source of lack of reliability in the LCM numbers is discretionary 
motivation. Results show that the asset write-down amounts are associated with 
some discretionary motivations. But the results also show positive association with 
proxies for asset impairment, supporting non-discretionary motivation for write-
down. To further investigate the possible effect of discretionary motivation on 
reliability of the LCM numbers, I partition the sample based on the magnitude of 
write-downs, categorizing firms with excessive write-downs or write-backs into one 
sample (HIGH) and the rest into the other (LOW). The t and Wilcoxon sign-rank 
tests show that write-down abuse is related to discretionary motivations. For the low 
write-down/write-back sample, J and Cox tests show that LCM is superior for both 
the return and price model with mixed results for the balance sheet model. With the 
same sample, the relative measurement error tests report significantly less 
measurement error for LCM than that for HCA. Results for the high write-
down/write-back sample are generally mixed, indicating that no improvement in 
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accounting reliability has been achieved in LCM. The fact that HCA is not 
unambiguously selected as the superior model for the high sample implies that non-
discretionary motivations are still an important element of large write-downs/write-
backs. Nevertheless, the results support the notion that LCM improves reliability of 
financial information in the absence of discretionary motivations. 
The results in this study have implications for accounting research and practice. 
The evidence here contributes to the ongoing debate on the usefulness of the asset 
write-down regulations. Results drawn in this study support the accounting reform. 
Asset write-down regulations provide more relevant information to investors. If 
properly used, these regulations can boost reliability of accounting information and 
thus provide more useful accounting information to investors. Regulators should 
consider more explicit guidelines to reduce unbiased measurement error and to 
strengthen the independent auditor’s position in opposing biased measurement error. 
Regulators may also consider incorporating rules prohibiting excessive write-downs.  
There are several limitations in this study. First, only 320 firms are covered in 
the four-year period. The firms represent the “survivors” over the 1998-2001 period. 
Although this introduces possible survivorship bias in the sample, balancing the 
panel increases the robustness of the regression models. Furthermore, the use of 
survivors makes it possible to abstract from heterogeneous effects such as IPO and 
bankruptcy or de-listing. Nevertheless, it should be possible to increase sample size 
in future studies. 
Second, this study uses relatively simple valuation models that do not fully 
capture information available in the market. The original models suffer from 
defective specifications, for example, non-normal residuals. Future work could 
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examine the value-relevance issue as well as reliability issues using valuation models 
that are richer and better specified, either empirically or theoretically. 
Finally, this study makes an effort in dealing with relevance and reliability 
issues separately from traditional value-relevance research. Reliability is defined as 
the difference between intrinsic market value and reported accounting value, known 
as measurement error. Two approaches were used in testing the magnitude of 
measurement error: model appropriateness test and relative measurement error test. 
This study, however, does not fully capture the characteristics of relevance and 
reliability. Reliability, for example, could be explained from other perspectives than 
measurement. Even if reliability is well defined in this study, the power of the 
reliability tests is restricted due to their inherent limitations. Analyses exploring other 
interpretations of relevance or reliability would add to deeper understanding of 
usefulness of financial statements to investors, regulators as well as academic 
researchers.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Write-downs Regulations Framework in China 
     
     
     
Asset Impairment Method Identification of Fair Value Loss Is Charged To Regulation 
     
Accounts Receivablea LCMb Recoverable Amountc Administration Expense AR1998 AR2001 
     
Short-term Investment LCM Market Value Investment Gain or Lossd AR1998 AR2001 
     
Long-term Investment LCM Recoverable Amount Investment Gain or Loss AR1998 AR2001 
     
Inventory LCM Net Selling Price Administration Expense AR1998 AR2001 
     
Fix Asset LCM Recoverable Amount Non-operating Expensed        AR2001 
     
Intangible Asset LCM Recoverable Amount Non-operating Expense        AR2001 
     
Construction In Progress LCM Recoverable Amount Non-operating Expense        AR2001 
     
Commission Loan LCM Recoverable Amount Investment Gain or Loss        AR2001 
Notes:     
a   Including Other Accounts Receivable    
b   Lower of historical cost or fair market value    
c   Recoverable Amount is the higher of the Net Selling Price (NSP) and its value in use (VIU) 
d   Affects non-operating result  
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Table 2 
Sample Selection 
Panel A: Comparisons Between Full Sample and Selected Sample   
          
Listing Location 
  Full Sample Selected Sample Percentage (Selected / Full) 
  Shanghai Shenzhen Total Shanghai Shenzhen Total Shanghai Shenzhen Total 
1998 438 413 851 184 136 320 42.01% 32.93% 37.60% 
1999 484 465 949 184 136 320 38.02% 29.25% 33.72% 
2000 572 516 1088 184 136 320 32.17% 26.36% 29.41% 
2001 646 514 1160 184 136 320 28.48% 26.46% 27.59% 
          
Share Type 
  Full Samplea Selected Sample 
  A A & B 
A & 
H B Total A percentage 
Other 
Shares percentage 
1998 727 80 18 26 851 320 44.02% 0 0.00% 
1999 822 82 19 26 949 320 38.93% 0 0.00% 
2000 955 86 19 28 1088 320 33.51% 0 0.00% 
2001 1023 88 25 24 1160 320 31.28% 0 0.00% 
          
Panel B: Selected Sample Firms by Industriesc      
Industry by GICSb N %           
Energy 5 1.56%      
Materials 48 15.00%      
Industrials 63 19.69%      
Consumer Discretionary 81 25.31%      
Consumer Staples 11 3.44%      
Health Care 30 9.38%      
Financials 33 10.31%      
Information Technology 34 10.63%      
Utilities 15 4.69%      
Sum 320 100.00%           
Notes:         
a  A stands for the companies issuing A shares only; A & B stands for the companies issuing    
   both A and B shares; A & H stands for the companies issuing both A and H shares; B stands for  
   the companies issuing B shares only.       
b  According to the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard), Sector (10) Energy includes (1010) Energy;  
   Sector (15) Materials includes (1510) Materials; Sector (20) Industrials includes (2010) Capital Goods,(2020)  
   Commercial Service & Supplies, (2030) Transportation; Sector (25) Consumer Discretionary includes   
   (2510) Automobile & Components, (2520) Consumer Durables & Apparel, (2530) Hostels, Restaurants & Leisure, 
   (2540) Media, (2550) Retailing; Sector (30) Consumer Staples includes (3010) Food & Staples Retailing,   
   (3020) Food, Beverage & Tobacco, (3030) Household & Personal Products; Sector (35) Health Care includes  
   (3510) Health Care Equipment & Services, (3520) Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology; Sector (40) Financials  
   includes (4010) Banks, (4020) Diversified Financials, (4030) Insurance, (4040) Real Estate;  
   Sector (45) Information Technology includes (4510) Software & Services, (4520) Technology Hardware & Equipment,  
   (4530) Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment; Sector (50) Telecommunication Services includes   
   (5010) Telecommunication Services; Sector (55) Utilities includes (5510) Utilities;   
c  Companies are categorized by their main business disclosed publicly. It is assumed that the main business   
   does not change during the research period. However, it is possible that some companies change business  
   after merges or acquisitions. The number of the companies who changed their main business during the   
   research period is small.        
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Table3  
Summary of Asset Write-down Provisions of Different Industries Within Selected Sample: 1998-2001   
GICSa   Prov1c Prov2 Prov3 Prov4 Prov5 Prov6 Prov7 Total Prov ∆Prov1 ∆Prov2 ∆Prov3 ∆Prov4 ∆Prov5 ∆Prov6 ∆Prov7 ∆Total Prov  TAmillion 
1 Meanb 0.0299 0.0054 0.0034 0.0136 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 0.0582 0.0088 0.0020 0.0014 0.0076 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 0.0221  1308.10  
 Medianb 0.0136 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0310 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0039   
                    
2 Mean 0.0593 0.0129 0.0087 0.0110 0.0003 0.0008 0.0000 0.1042 0.0166 0.0044 0.0037 0.0055 0.0003 0.0008 0.0000 0.0364  1202.43  
 Median 0.0177 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0420 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0074   
                    
3 Mean 0.0332 0.0149 0.0059 0.0098 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0733 0.0106 0.0041 0.0023 0.0054 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0262  1645.45  
 Median 0.0128 0.0022 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0348 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056   
                    
4 Mean 0.0677 0.0146 0.0063 0.0132 0.0015 0.0001 0.0000 0.1096 0.0291 0.0024 0.0007 0.0073 0.0015 0.0001 0.0000 0.0434  1259.69  
 Median 0.0262 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0487 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0115   
                    
5 Mean 0.0640 0.0302 0.0147 0.0047 0.0019 0.0009 0.0000 0.1277 0.0142 0.0080 0.0028 0.0023 0.0019 0.0009 0.0000 0.0362  1499.66  
 Median 0.0174 0.0041 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0482 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058   
                    
6 Mean 0.0692 0.0263 0.0078 0.0065 0.0014 0.0005 0.0000 0.1131 0.0226 0.0069 0.0023 0.0045 0.0014 0.0005 0.0000 0.0398  999.04  
 Median 0.0217 0.0046 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0485 0.0044 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0104   
                    
7 Mean 0.0193 0.0012 0.0045 0.0044 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0297 0.0067 0.0005 0.0017 0.0025 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0117  2696.86  
  Median 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0146 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022    
Notes:                  
a    GICS is an industry classification system, developed by Standard & Poor+            
     For purposes of this table, some GICS categories were combined yielding 7 industries : Industry 1=Energy + Materials, 2=Industrials, 3=Consumer Discretionary + Consumer Staples, 4=Health Care, 5=Financials, 
     6=Information Technology, 7=Utilities.               
b    Extreme values are winsorized within groups and years.              
c    These are all ratios of write-down provisions or change of provisions to the  historical book value of related assets;        
     Prov1 is the write-down provision for accounts receivables, including accounts receivable and other accounts receivable;        
     Prov2 is the write-down provision for inventories;              
     Prov3 is the write-down provision for investments, including short-term and long-term investments;         
     Prov4 is the write-down provision for fix assets;              
     Prov5 is the write-down provision for intangible assets;             
     Prov6 is the write-down provision for construction in progress;             
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      Prov7 is the write-down provision for commission loans;             
      Total Prov = Prov1 + Prov2 + Prov3 + Prov4 + Prov5 +Prov6 + Prov7;            
      ∆Prov1 is the changes in write-down provision for accounts receivables, including accounts receivable and other accounts receivable;       
      ∆Prov2 is the changes in write-down provision for inventories;             
      ∆Prov3 is the changes in write-down provision for investments, including short-term and long-term investments;        
      ∆Prov4 is the changes in write-down provision for fix assets;             
      ∆Prov5 is the changes in write-down provision for intangible assets;            
      ∆Prov6 is the changes in write-down provision for construction in progress;            
      ∆Prov7 is the changes in write-down provision for commission loans;            
      ∆Total Prov = ∆Prov1 + ∆Prov2 + ∆Prov3 + ∆Prov4 + ∆Prov5 +∆Prov6 + ∆Prov7;           
      ∆Prov = current period provision - last period provision, which is the amount of current write-down if it is positive;         
      TA is the industry mean total asset.                
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables: 1998-2001 
Original Data Winsorized Data 
Regressorsa Mean 
Std.dev of  
annual means Mean 
Std.dev of  
annual means 
     
MVE 10.9779 2.7944 10.9188 2.7729 
BVA0 0.7419 0.2381 0.7332 0.2329 
BVL 2.3932 0.4762 2.3772 0.4787 
BVAH 3.8169 0.5254 3.8007 0.5305 
BVAC 3.6361 0.4107 3.6213 0.4164 
BVEH 2.1656 0.2890 2.1629 0.2929 
BVEC 1.9848 0.1740 1.9860 0.1817 
PROV 0.1808 0.1209 0.1755 0.1193 
R 0.2591 0.4393 0.2524 0.4374 
Eh 0.1092 0.0512 0.1109 0.0491 
∆Eh -0.0254 0.0634 -0.0254 0.0620 
Ec 0.0816 0.0460 0.0870 0.0414 
∆Ec -0.0303 0.0406 -0.0307 0.0390 
WDGL 0.0275 0.0162 0.025451 0.0152 
Notes:     
a  All the variables are reported in per share amounts, which have been adjusted for stock splits and dividends.  
   MVE   = market value of common equity,    
   BVA0  = book value of asset other than those affected by write-down regulation,  
   BVL   = book value of liability,    
   BVAH  = historical book value of asset that are affected by write-down regulation, before providing any provisions  
   BVAC  = reported book value of asset that are affected by write-down regulation,  
   PROV  = reported or disclosed book value of asset write-down provision   
   BVEH  =historical book value of net asset,    
   BVEC  =reported book value of net asset,    
   R      = annual stock return, beginning from three months later after the fiscal year end  
   Eh     = historical number of earnings before any write-down gains and losses,   
   ∆Eh    = changes of historical number of earnings before any write-down gains and losses,  
   Ec     = reported earnings    
   ∆Ec    = changes of reported number of earnings    
   WDGL =write-down gains and losses, with a positive number meaning an losses  
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics for Balance Sheet Model Regression 
              
  
 
          
a   
                        
Panel A: Fixed Effects Regression           
    α0  α1  α2  α3   α4  adj. R2 nobs. 
1998-2001 Coef. -  0.059 -0.033 0.040 -0.275 70.00% 1280 
 tb -  2.718 *** -1.712 * 2.280 ** -7.092***   
         
1999-2001 Coef. -  0.051 -0.080 0.078 -0.214 68.10% 960 
  t -  2.258 ** -4.111 *** 4.218 *** -4.426***     
             
Panel B: Annual Regression            
    α0  α1  α2  α3   α4  adj. R2 nobs. 
1998 Coef. 1.550  0.314 -0.123  0.138  0.413 15.10% 320 
 t 26.458*** 4.960 *** -3.290 *** 4.305 *** 1.201   
          
1999 Coef. 2.312 0.161 -0.016  0.001  -0.036 1.50% 320 
 t 35.104*** 2.800 *** -0.457  0.048  -0.340   
          
2000 Coef. 2.577 0.092 0.010  -0.013  -0.149 5.20% 320 
 t 55.609*** 2.993 *** 0.498  -0.808  -2.074**   
          
2001 Coef. 2.257 0.086 0.018  -0.014  -0.186 10.50% 320 
  t 45.493*** 3.757 *** 1.044  -0.874   -3.026***     
              
Notes:              
*** significant at 0.01 level            
**   significant at 0.05 level            
*     significant at 0.1 level            
a      MVE  = Natural log form of per share market value of common equity, three months after the fiscal year-end,    
        BVA0 = Per share book value of asset other than those affected by write-down regulation ,     
        BVL   = Per share book value of liabilities,          
        BVAH= Per share historical book value of assets that are affected by write-down regulation , before providing any provisions   
        PROV= per share reported or disclosed book value of asset write-down provision        
b     t values are reported using White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent estimates      
it43210it        0    υααααα +++++= itititit PROVBVAHBVLBVAMVE
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Table 6 
Summary Statistics for Return Model Regression 
    
 
          
           a  
                      
 Panel A: Fixed Affect Regression         
    β0 β1 β2 β3 adj. R2 nobs.
 1998-2001 Coef. -  2.111 0.979 -0.420 55.57% 1280 
  tb -  4.197 *** 2.707 *** -0.918   
         
 1999-2001 Coef. -  2.289 0.736 -1.530 61.18% 960 
   t -   3.745 *** 1.767 * 3.275 ***     
            
 Panel B: Annual Regression          
     β0 β1 β2 β3   adj. R2 nobs.
 1998 Coef. 0.065  0.529 2.987  5.691  14.85% 320 
  t 2.760 *** 0.721 4.206 *** 4.070 ***   
          
 1999 Coef. 0.136 1.945 1.700  -1.627  13.09% 320 
  t 7.208 *** 3.671 *** 2.824 *** 1.062    
          
 2000 Coef. 0.559 -0.045 2.539  -1.652  8.20% 320 
  t 30.675 *** -0.091 3.864 *** -2.266 **   
          
 2001 Coef. -0.286 2.290 0.069  -1.220  8.81% 320 
   t -18.890 *** 3.451 *** 0.096  -1.916 *     
             
 Notes:            
 ***  significant at 0.01 level          
 **   significant at 0.05 level          
 *     significant at 0.1 level          
 a     R = the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 12-month period ending 3 months following fiscal year end  
        Eh= per share earnings before any write-down accounting adjustments, deflated by the share price at the beginning of the year   
       ∆Eh= the change in Eh          
       WDGL= per share write-down gains and losses, deflated by the share price at the beginning of the year   
 b    t values are reported in White (1980) adjusted values       
it3210          νββββ ++∆++= ithithitit WDGLEER
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Table 7 
Summary Statistics for Price Model Regression 
      
   
 
a   
                           
Panel A: Fixed Affect Regression          
    γ0   γ1   γ2   γ3   γ4   adj. R2 nobs. 
1998-2001 Coef. -  0.017  -0.079  0.437  -0.188   73.37% 1280 
 tb -  1.147  -1.722 * 11.967 *** -3.380  ***   
              
1999-2001 Coef. -  0.038  0.043  0.359  -0.277   70.79% 960 
  t -   2.045 ** 0.771   8.747 *** -5.237  ***     
              
Panel B: Annual Regression           
    γ0   γ1   γ2   γ3   γ4   adj. R2 nobs. 
1998 Coef. 1.575  0.165  0.973  0.247  -0.210   14.98% 320 
 t 27.769 *** 5.637 *** 0.604  1.530 * -0.146     
              
1999 Coef. 2.313  -0.020  0.238  0.586  -0.593   6.79% 320 
 t 35.644 *** -0.736  1.840 * 5.274 *** -1.941  *   
              
2000 Coef. 2.601  -0.029  0.081  0.422  -0.521   11.84% 320 
 t 60.903 *** -1.616 * 1.013  5.455 *** -3.241  ***   
              
2001 Coef. 2.343  -0.042  0.079  0.605  -0.238   20.65% 320 
  t 51.586 *** -2.600 *** 1.072   7.461 *** -2.290  **     
              
Notes:              
*** significant at 0.01 level           
**   significant at 0.05 level           
*     significant at 0.1 level           
a      MVE  = Natural log form of market value of common equity per share, three months after the fiscal year end,  
       BVEH = per share book value of net asset before the adjustments of asset  write-down regulation    
       PROV = per share amount of asset write-down provisions        
       Eh = per share earnings before the adjustments of asset write-down gains and losses     
       WDGL= per share amount of asset write-down gains and losses       
b   t values are reported in White (1980) adjusted values       
it43210        ωγγγγγ +++++= ithitititit WDGLEPROVBVEHMVE
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Table 8  
Non-nested Models Comparison  
Panel A: Balance Sheet Modela                   
 adj.R squares J Test   Cox Test   
 Hb Lc Test 1d Test 2e  Test 1   Test 2  
1998-2001 68.76% 69.31% 5.978 *** -4.294***  -30.156*** 9.288*** 
1999-2001 67.30% 67.87% 3.864 *** -1.916   -15.451*** 5.134*** 
            
Panel B: Return Modelf               
 adj.R squares J Test   Cox Test  
 H L Test 1 Test 2   Test 1   Test 2  
1998-2001 55.59% 54.59% 0.892 4.767 ***  -0.823 -5.956*** 
1999-2001 60.85% 60.75% 2.388 *** 2.717 ***  -3.919*** -4.648*** 
            
Panel C: Price Modelg               
 adj.R squares J Test   Cox Test  
 H L Test 1 Test 2   Test 1   Test 2  
1998-2001 72.71% 72.95% 4.753 *** 3.668 ***  -4.581*** -3.353*** 
1999-2001 69.75% 70.52% 4.613 *** 2.182 **  -8.697*** -3.182*** 
Notes:            
**  Significant at 0.01 levels           
*   Significant at 0.05 levels           
a   Equation (4) and (5)           
b   Historical cost accounting            
c   Lower of cost or market accounting          
d   The null hypothesis in test 1 is that HCA is appropriate, the alternative is that LCM is appropriate    
e   The null hypothesis in test 2 is LCM is appropriate, the alternative is that HCA is appropriate     
f   Equation (6) and (7)           
g   Equation (8) and (9)           
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Table 9 
Relative Measurement Error 
Panel A: Balance Sheet Model        
  σ2umvac - σ2umvaha 
   Barth (1991)c  Boone (2002)  
1998-2001b  0.1124  0.0737  
F test  3122.9 *** 562.54 *** 
      
1999-2001  0.1995  0.1690  
F test  5726.33 *** 1753.41 *** 
      
Panel B: Return Model      
  Vuong's Z valued 
  Earnings Level  Earnings Change  
1998-2001  0.411  0.372  
      
1999-2001  -0.06  -0.044  
Notes:     
*,**,*** denote significance in two-tailed tests at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
a  σ2umvah denotes the measurement error variance from asset BVAH, σ2umvac denotes that from asset BVAC.  
b  Regressions are fix-effects controlled. 
c  Two approaches are from Barth (1991) and Boone (2002). A positive value in Barth (1991) indicates that  
   LCM contains more measurement error while the same value in Boone (2002) only indicates that LCM contains  
   no less measurement error than that in HCA. A negative value in both research shows a decreased measurement error in LCM. 
d  Vuong test is constructed as HCA versus LCM. A positive Z value indicates that LCM contains more measurement error. 
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Table 10 
Determinants of Write-down Amounts and Accumulated Provisions   
Panel A: Variable Description          
Description      Variable  Pool Sample 
                 Mean   Std dev. 
Count 
(firms) 
Log Firm Total Assets     SIZE  1.40  0.48 - 
Leverage (%)      LEV  48.45  18.36 - 
Market-to-book Ratio     MTB  5.48  3.82  
Change in Market-to-book Ratio   ∆MTB  0.32  7.95 - 
Unclean Audit Opinion (% of firm)   AO  7.73  26.72 99  
Financial Distress (% of firm)    FD  5.23  22.28 67  
Industry Adjusted Return On Asset (%)   IAROA  0.00  6.28 - 
Unusually Good Performance (% of firm)   GOOD  10.00  30.01 128  
Unusually Poor Performance (% of firm)   POOR  10.00  30.01 128  
Small Loss (% of firm)     TURN  6.80  25.18 87  
Current Write-down Amounts (%)   RDIFP  1.77  4.75 - 
Accumulated Write-down Provisions (%)   RPROV   4.53   7.13 - 
            
Panel B: Pearson (right) and Spearman (left) Correlation Matrix           
 AO ST   SIZE   LEV   MTB    ∆MTB   IROA    GOOD   POOR    TURN  
AO  0.103 0.013 0.157 0.081 0.026 -0.357 -0.077 0.293 0.050  
Prob > |R|  0.000 0.632 0.000 0.004 0.362 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.076  
ST 0.103 -0.076 0.228 0.258 0.085 -0.242 -0.043 0.202 0.048  
Prob > |R| 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.086  
SIZE 0.009 -0.086 0.434 -0.230 -0.082 -0.006 -0.114 -0.078 0.017  
Prob > |R| 0.735 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.833 0.000 0.005 0.540  
LEV 0.148 0.199 0.435 0.287 0.101 -0.327 -0.153 0.227 0.010  
Prob > |R| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.728  
MTB 0.066 0.201 -0.315 0.285 0.391 -0.083 0.103 0.185 -0.003  
Prob > |R| 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.926  
∆MTB 0.066 0.062 -0.187 0.120 0.407 -0.111 -0.029 0.128 0.005  
Prob > |R| 0.019 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.849  
IROA -0.289 -0.210 -0.066 -0.321 0.030 -0.146 0.477 -0.760 -0.100  
Prob > |R| 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
GOOD -0.077 -0.043 -0.096 -0.163 0.142 -0.052 0.518 -0.111 -0.090  
Prob > |R| 0.006 0.122 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.001  
POOR 0.293 0.202 -0.089 0.212 0.151 0.188 -0.519 -0.111 -0.059  
Prob > |R| 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035  
TURN 0.050 0.048 0.011 0.015 0.015 -0.089 -0.222 -0.090 -0.059  
Prob > |R| 0.076 0.086 0.687 0.593 0.597 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.035    
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Table 10 Continued   
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis of Factors Influencing Current Write-down Amounts          
    1998-2001 1999-2001 1998 1999 2000 2001 
  Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  
Intercept  - -  - -  0.004 1.228  0.033 3.853 *** 0.012 1.028  0.003 0.237   
AO  0.034  4.026  *** 0.030 2.626 *** 0.015 1.665 * 0.024 1.953 * 0.021 1.555  0.071 2.388  *** 
FD  -0.033  -3.163  *** -0.036 -2.990 *** 0.003 0.431  -0.015 -1.291  -0.005 -0.310  -0.036 -1.580   
SIZE  -0.012  -1.529   -0.008 -0.727  -0.003 -1.785 * 0.001 0.140  0.000 0.051  -0.010 -1.162  * 
LEV  0.054  2.276  ** 0.068 2.010 ** 0.001 0.261  0.003 0.235  -0.002 -0.131  0.055 2.237  ** 
∆MTB  -0.001  -2.034  ** -0.001 -1.956 * 0.000 -1.037  -0.001 -1.791 * 0.000 -0.954  -0.001 -0.824   
IAROA  -0.139  -2.240  ** -0.138 -1.926 * -0.045 -0.885  -0.329 -3.157 *** -0.167 -1.119  -0.286 -1.758  * 
GOOD  0.022  3.486  *** 0.026 3.287 *** 0.003 0.682  0.019 2.017 ** 0.027 2.202 ** 0.041 2.899  *** 
POOR  -0.009  -0.889   -0.011 -0.876  0.017 2.140 ** -0.003 -0.190  -0.043 -1.830 * -0.025 -0.905   
TURN  -0.023  -4.607  *** -0.027 -4.551 *** -0.006 -1.378  -0.002 -0.195  -0.025 -2.393 *** -0.018 -2.727  *** 
R-square   14.58%     13.68%     24.08%     13.81%     5.33%     21.62%     
                    
Panel D: Multivariate Analysis of Factors Influencing Accumulated Write-down Accumulated Provisions       
variable   1998-2001 1999-2001 1998 1999 2000 2001 
  Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  Est. t  
Intercept  - -  - -  0.001 0.304  0.033 3.726 *** 0.071 4.554 *** 0.101 3.949  *** 
AO  0.030 3.794 *** 0.019 2.239 ** 0.011 1.234  0.028 2.384 *** 0.069 4.047 *** 0.086 2.718  *** 
FD  0.034 3.171 *** 0.033 3.258 *** 0.004 0.540  0.008 0.694  0.068 2.975 *** 0.073 2.424  *** 
SIZE  -0.079 -7.224 *** -0.083 -6.904 *** -0.001 -0.309  -0.003 -0.488  -0.018 -2.134 ** -0.044 -2.823  *** 
LEV  0.130 4.132 *** 0.156 4.615 *** -0.001 -0.139  0.016 0.895  0.021 0.878  0.104 2.797  *** 
MTB  -0.004 -2.597 *** -0.005 -3.517 *** 0.001 0.848  0.001 0.629  -0.002 -2.229 ** -0.006 -2.229  ** 
IAROA  -0.172 -2.656 ** -0.151 -2.319 ** -0.051 -0.989  -0.437 -4.010 *** -0.266 -1.358  -0.490 -2.763  *** 
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continued                    
GOOD  -0.024 3.796 *** 0.024 3.347 *** 0.002 0.548  0.025 2.656 *** 0.030 1.871 * 0.042 2.644  *** 
POOR  0.014 1.459  0.022 2.120 ** 0.017 1.895 * -0.008 -0.416  0.005 0.211  0.042 1.335   
TURN  -0.013 -2.557 ** -0.018 -3.260 *** -0.003 -0.590  0.005 0.433  -0.008 -0.441  -0.001 -0.066   
R-square   63.11%     72.32%     25.46%     23.38%     34.14%     49.16%     
Notes:                    
*,**,*** denote significance in two-tailed tests at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.       
a     Following variables are computed with historical data:            
      SIZE = Ln (per share total asset );               
      LEV = total liability / total asset;                
      MTB = market value of equity/book value of equity;               
      ∆MTB = MTBt- MTBt-1;                
      IAROA = ROA - ROAmean, where ROA = earning / total asset and ROAmean is the industry mean ROA     
b     FD,AO,GOOD, POOR and TURN are binary dummy variables. FD stands for finance distress, FD=1 if a company is in "ST" or "PT"; AO stands for  
      audit opinion, AO=1 if a company receives an qualified opinion that year; GOOD stands for good performance, GOOD=1 if a company's industry  
      adjusted ROA achieves a top 10%; POOR stands for poor performance, POOR=1 if its ROA is in bottom 10%; TURN stands for the possibility  
      to turn profit, TURN=1if a company's current earnings per share is within the area of -0.1 to 0.       
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Table 11  
Descriptions for Sub Samples   
Panel A: Firm distribution       
Industry by GICS Full Sample Higha,b %    
Energy & Materials 53 24  45.28%   
Industrials 63 28  44.44%   
Consumer Discretionary & Staples 92 53  57.61%   
Health Care 30 16  53.33%   
Financials 33 18  54.55%   
Information Technology 34 24  70.59%   
Utilities 15 3  20.00%   
Sum 320 166  51.88%      
         
Panel B: Firm Profile               
 Mean   Median   
 Low High T test Low High
 
Wilcoxo
n Z test 
RPROVc 0.017 0.071 -15.078*** 0.013 0.045 -14.150 *** 
ROA 0.046 0.008 11.180*** 0.044 0.022 10.452 *** 
IAROA 0.019 -0.018 11.151*** 0.020 -0.005 10.401 *** 
MTB 5.111 5.828 -3.396*** 4.213 4.689 -3.444 *** 
∆MTB -0.003 0.628 -1.461 -0.109 0.231 -2.509 ** 
AO 0.023 0.128 -7.363*** 0.000 0.000 -7.042 *** 
FD 0.013 0.089 -6.345*** 0.000 0.000 -6.087 *** 
GOOD 0.125 0.077 2.879*** 0.000 0.000 2.870 *** 
POOR 0.016 0.178 -10.288*** 0.000 0.000 -9.618 *** 
TURN 0.044 0.090 -3.316*** 0.000 0.000 -3.303 *** 
R 0.255 0.250 1.314 0.120 0.132 0.860 
SIZE 1.386 1.407 -0.783 1.400 1.395 -0.162 
LEV 0.459 0.509 -4.913*** 0.460 0.514 -4.689 *** 
Notes:         
***  Significant at the level of 0.01       
**   Significant at the level of 0.05       
*    Significant at the level of 0.1       
a    I rank the annual sample by absolutes value of current write-down ratio and mark the top 20% portfolio as 
      the high written down firms. If the firms were marked as "high" in one of the sample years, they will be    
categorized in HIGH sample. Otherwise, they will be categorized in LOW sample. 
b    2-way table chi-squared statistic is 14.52, significant at the 0.05 level    
c    see Table 10 for definitions other than RET      
     see Table 4 for definitions for R.       
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Table 12 
Non-nested Model Comparisons in Sub Samples 
Panel A: Balance Sheet Model                   
 Low High 
                      
 adj.R squares  J Testa Cox Test  adj.R squares J Test  Cox Test   
 H W Test 1  Test 2  Test 1  Test 2  H W Test 1  Test 2  Test 1  Test 2  
1998-2001 69.09% 69.07% -2.072** 2.137** 93.359*** -281.4*** 69.97% 70.75% 4.306*** -2.298** -17.88*** 5.004*** 
1999-2001 66.89% 66.91% 0.469  -0.29 -15.45*** 8.943*** 68.35% 69.13% 3.103*** -1.125  -12.86*** 3.121*** 
                      
Panel B: Return Model                    
 Low High 
 adj.R squares  J Test Cox Test  adj.R squares J Test  Cox Test   
 H W Test 1  Test 2 Test 1  Test 2  H W Test 1  Test 2  Test 1  Test 2  
1998-2001 60.19% 60.66% 2.406*** 0.572 -4.076*** -0.888 54.93% 54.42% 1.001 2.555*** -1.648* -5.2*** 
1999-2001 64.36% 64.92% 2.269** 0.533 -4.79*** -0.932  60.37% 60.68% 2.006** 1.186  -6.665*** -3.17*** 
                      
Panel C: Price Model                    
 Low High 
 adj.R squares  J Test Cox Test  adj.R squares J Test  Cox Test   
 H W Test 1  Test 2 Test 1  Test 2  H W Test 1  Test 2  Test 1  Test 2  
1998-2001 73.51% 73.86% 9.156*** 0.47 -4.938*** -0.82 73.50% 74.05% 4.213*** 2.692*** -5.627*** -3.2*** 
1999-2001 70.56% 71.21% 2.631*** 0.244 -7.318*** -0.524  70.06% 71.31% 3.96*** 1.239  -11.01*** -2.29** 
                      
Notes:                      
***  Significant at the level of 0.01                  
**   Significant at the level of 0.05                  
a    Tests are defined in Table 8.                  
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Table 13 
Relative Measurement Error in Sub Samples 
Panel A: Balance Sheet Model              
  σ2umvac - σ2umvach 
  Low High 
    
Barth 
(1991)   
Boone 
(2002)    
Barth 
(1991)   
Boone 
(2002)   
1998-
2001  -0.0525  -0.0709  0.2109  0.1723  
F test  4377.22 *** 5373.85 *** 3377.31 *** 895.88 *** 
       
1999-
2001  -0.0320  -0.0471  0.2394  0.1975  
F test   1099.54 *** 1662.56 ***  2010.71 *** 601.90 *** 
          
Panel B: Return Model                
  Vuong's Z value 
  Low High 
    
Earnings 
Level   
Earnings 
Change    
Earnings 
Level   
Earnings 
Change   
1998-
2001  -0.162  -0.414  0.138  0.182  
        
1999-
2001   -0.465   -0.660    -0.474   -0.232   
Notes:          
*,**,*** denote significance in two-tailed tests at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
a    Tests are defined in Table 9       
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Appendix A:  Model Specification45 
I. Model Derivation 
Various parties such as shareholders, investors or lenders will have explicit 
interests in valuing firms. Modern accounting and finance research began with ideas 
of finding mis-priced securities. During the past several decades, researchers devised 
numerous models to estimate firms’ intrinsic values. Three major models were 
developed: dividend-discounting, capitalization, and residual income valuation. 
I - 1. Discounting models 
The discounting model is often referred to as dividend discounting. The model 
defines share price as the present value of expected future dividends discounted at 
their risk-adjusted expected rate of return. Formally,  
)1(/]}[{ 11 jttokjkttok tt rDEP +=+∞= +∏= ∑               (A-1) 
where Pt is share price at time t, Et[Dt+k] is market’s expectation of dividends in 
period t+k, and Rt+j is risk-adjusted discount rate that reflects the systematic risk of 
dividends in period t+j. 
As seen from (A-1), price depends on forecasts of future dividends and discount 
rates for future periods. The Gordon growth model makes simplifying assumptions. 
Specifically, if the discount rate, r, is constant through time and dividends are 
                                                 
45 Some contents are based on existing review papers, for example, Kothari (2001).  
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expected to grow at a constant rate g (g<r), then the value of a firm can be expressed 
in terms of expected dividends, discount rate and constant growth rate: 
)/(][ 1 grDEP ttt −= +                                         (A-2) 
Though the discounting model has theoretical foundations, it is not often 
employed in empirical research because of its restrictive assumptions. Finance 
researchers soon simplified this model. Later research points out, the dividend policy 
per se does not affect firm value, instead, it is the firm’s investment policy that 
matters. The growth rate also depends on reinvestment, which can increase future 
market value. This approach led to models laying stress on investment and its 
capitalization process. 
I-2. The capitalization models 
The idea of the capitalization models is that a firm’s value is either the sum of 
past operating results or the expectations of future operating results. The first 
approach is the equity model: the value of a firm is the result of investments and 
reinvestments transformed into equity. The share price in this model is: 
ttt uMVEP +=                   (A-3) 
where Pt is share price at time t, MVEt is market value of equity at time t, and ut is 
error term caused by unrecognized accounting information or conservatism. 
(A-3) can be decomposed as:  
tttt uMVLMVAP ++=                                          (A-4) 
where MVAt is market value of assets at time t, MVLt is market value of liability at 
time t, and ut is error term. Here the firm’s market value is a weighted combination of 
asset and liability market value (Landsman 1986). Book value of assets and liabilities 
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are often used as proxies for market value of assets and liabilities, because the market 
values are seldom available. That is, 
tttttt uBVLBVAuBVEP ++=+=     (A-5)                          
where BVEt is book value of equity at time t, BVAt is book value of asset at time t, 
BVLt is book value of liability at time t, and ut is error term. 
(A-5) is referred to as the “balance sheet model”, and its format varies with 
different research objects. The balance sheet model was first used by Beaver et al 
(1989) in research on non-performing loans and later used by Barth et al (1991). 
Since then, this model has been frequently used in accounting research because of its 
conceptual basis and ease of application in accounting setting. Moreover, it is 
suitable for research that focuses on measurement error in reported accounting 
numbers (Barth 1991, 1994, Choi, et al. 1997, Boone 2002). 
The second view is that firm value is the expectation of future operating results, 
which is closely related to the discounting models. If the expected return on 
investment in all future periods is r, then the share price Pt can be expressed as:  
t
t
t vr
XE
P += + )( 1                 (A-6) 
where E(Xt+1) is forecasted earnings for the next period at the time t, r is return rate 
that supposed to be constant over periods, and νt is an error term.  
Equation (A-6) can be explained as the “capitalized value of the earnings stream 
produced by the assets that the firm currently holds.” Earnings capitalization models 
are popular in accounting research, especially in earnings response coefficient 
research. E(Xt+1) is replaced with Xt , which is the current income, when incomes are 
assumed to be constant in future periods. 
79 
Despite apparent differences between the balance sheet model and the income 
capitalization model, they both reduce to the income statement model mathematically.  
Take first differences in the balance sheet model, (A-5), obtaining, 
ttt uBVEP ∆+∆=∆                                             (A-7) 
Next, ttt dXBVE −=∆ , which means the current year’s change in net worth is 
caused only by the change in the income statement, current earnings Xt, and the 
current dividend dt. (A-7) can be transformed into the income statement model, 
ttttttt uPXPdPt
'
11 //)(Re +=+∆= −−                              (A-8) 
where, Rett is the holding return from time t-1 to time t, including price increase and 
dividend, Xt is current earnings as of t, Pt-1 is share price at t-1, and u’t is the error.    
One can, by the same token, derive the income statement model from (A-6). 
Suppose that the current share price is cum-dividend, and this relation holds 
constantly.  (A-9) is the earnings capitalization model for time t-1: 
1
1
1 −
−
− += ttt vr
X
P                                             (A-9) 
Subtracting (A-9) from (A-6) gives an alternative expression of the income statement 
model in change of earnings: 
'
111 )/(
1/)(Re ttttttt vPXr
PPPt +∆=−= −−−    (A-10)                        
It is an empirical issue whether level of earnings or change of earnings better 
explains security returns. Ball and Brown (1968), as well as Beaver (1968), have set 
the basic theoretical work for the income statement model in the 1960s. They define 
the information content of earnings in terms of abnormal earnings, measured by the 
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difference between actual and expected earnings, with expected earnings estimated 
as last year’s actual earnings. The reason to use abnormal earnings is testing the 
market reaction to so-called “good news” or “bad news” within a specific window 
rather than the change of earnings in reaction tests. However, others use the level of 
earnings. Therefore, there are two competing constructs for measuring information 
content in earnings. Efficient securities market theory predicts that security prices 
will react quickly and in an unbiased manner to new information and there should be 
no abnormal returns under both methods. When the assumption of efficient markets 
is relaxed, however, matters become less clear. Ball and Brown (1968) believe that 
the return in their model is better explained by abnormal earnings. Easton and Harris 
(1991) further develop the model of Ball and Brown (1986) and suggest that both the 
level model (A-8) and change model (A-10) proxy for abnormal earnings and can be 
used to account for market return. They suggest use of a mixed level and change 
model: 
''
111 //Re tttttt vPXPXt +∆+= −−−                       (A-11) 
The explanatory power of the income statement model is generally lower than 
that of the balance sheet or capitalization models. Market volatility can also reduce 
explanatory power, which effect is conspicuous in China (Lee and Cao 2002). 
I-3. The residual income models 
The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) residual income valuation 
model has become popular in the literature. Starting with a dividend-discounting 
model, the residual income valuation model expresses firm value as the sum of 
current book value and the discounted present value of expected abnormal earnings, 
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which combines the previous two capitalization views. The standard residual income 
model is expressed as: 
∑∞
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where BVEt is book value of equity at time t, Et is the expectation operator where the 
expectation is based on information available at time t, Xt is current earnings for 
period t, and r is risk-adjusted discount rate . 
Olhson (1995) imposes a time-series structure on the abnormal earnings ( atX ) 
in (A-12). The linear information dynamics in the model specifies an autoregressive, 
time-series decay in the current period’s abnormal earnings (A-13), and models 
“information other than abnormal earnings” into prices (A-14). 
1,11 ++ ++= ttatat vXX εω                                        (A-13) 
1,21 ++ += ttt vv εγ                                           (A-14) 
where νt is the correlated residual in time t and εt is the uncorrelated residual in time t. 
The two equations above are known as the Olhson (1995) model. 
The economic intuition for the autoregressive process in abnormal earnings is 
that competition will sooner or later erode above-normal returns and that firms who 
are experiencing below-normal rates of returns eventually exit the market. The other 
information in the Ohlson model formalized the idea that prices reflect a richer 
information set than transaction-based, historical-cost earnings. The Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995) model (hereafter, F-O model) retains much of the structure of the 
Ohlson(1995) except the autoregressive time-series process. As one of the few 
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attempts in accounting theory to address empirical finance issues, the F-O model is 
often used in empirical research ( Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).  
The F-O model is superior to the dividend-discounting model in its ease of 
implementation. First, the assumptions are more common and make the work easier. 
Second, it provides a role for many important features of the accounting system, 
covering areas like clean surplus, book value as well as earnings, transitory 
components of earnings, conservatism, and delayed recognition. However, some 
aspects of this model are unsupported by the empirical data, such as linearity 
properties. It should be pointed out that most of the F-O models are conducted in 
“reduced forms”, rather than the original residual income model. Often, abnormal 
earnings are replaced with current year earnings, which form the “price model”, 
where market equity value becomes a function of book value of equity and current 
earnings. This model is:  
tttt XBVEP ε++=                                   (A-15) 
where Pt is share price in time t, BVEt is book value of equity per share in time t, and 
Xt is reported net income per share in time t.  
Each model may be able to explain share prices in some aspects. It is not wise to 
criticize one model on the grounds that its assumptions are too restrictive to represent 
the real world. Model efficiency should be examined empirically. 
II. The Discussion on Model Inappropriateness and Possible Remedy    
It is expected that stock price does not have a linear association with accounting 
information in China. The U.S. market saw an escalating gap between the book and 
market value during the last 20 years of the 20th century. There is some doubt 
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whether the linear model used pervasively in accounting research could capture the 
market-book relation that could actually be nonlinear. Also, researchers are less 
likely to uncover a one to one relation between market and book value, the 
theoretical assumption still held by many researchers. If I use conventional models in 
this study, results could be biased due to model mis-specification.  
First, a nonlinear relation between market and book value could exist in China, 
where resources are not evenly distributed. Listed companies are more or less 
controlling scare resources that bring extra profits, which could either be a privilege, 
a technology advantage, or a monopoly. HW 2001 note that, if the firm has some 
competitive advantage, for example, proprietary technology that may not be 
separable and saleable, that allows it to earn a positive abnormal return (economic 
rents), then (A-5), the balance sheet model, might not hold. In such a case, total 
equity value exceeds the combined value of net assets, even if the assets are valued at 
market. Then equity value is a weighted average of operations value (value from 
continuing operations plus value of future expansion) and abandonment value (net 
asset value) (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). If agency costs are low, the firm will 
liquidate when the value of net assets value exceeds the operations value of the firm. 
It is especially important to consider the abandonment option, without which the 
value of net assets is not associated with the value of the firm except to the extent it 
affects future operating cash flows. Although some investors in China can sell shares 
if the price has reached the abandonment point, it is difficult for the State 
government, who is the major investor in china, to liquidate. Considering that the 
majority shareholder in China is the State rather than individual investors, the effect 
of abandonment value is relatively small. Therefore, the relation between firm value 
and value of net assets value is neither zero nor a one-to-one linearity in China. If 
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operations value exceeds net assets but there is a likelihood of abandonment then 
equity value could has a nonlinear relation with net assets (Wysocki 1999).  
Second, existing models by no means incorporate all the variables reflected in 
market price because of information asymmetry. The information that investors rely 
on might be quite different from reported accounting information. For example, 
political information and rumor are important in China. Therefore stock prices 
incorporate some information that is not explained by accounting numbers. Model 
inappropriateness leads to biased results even if the market-book relation is linear. 
Remedies against model inappropriateness vary in practice. Many value-
relevance studies using the balance sheet model allow the possibility that firms have 
a competitive advantage. To eliminate the economic rent effect, some researchers 
convert it to an identity by including a goodwill term, defined as the difference 
between market value of equity and net asset value: 
GWBVLBVAMVE       ++=  (A-16) 
where MVE is the security market value, BVA is the book value of equity, BVL is 
the book value of liability, and GW = goodwill = MVE - MVA -MVL. Sometimes, 
researchers incorporate variables in their model to proxy non-accounting information, 
for example, an indicator variable for bull or bear market. 
Variable adding is one remedy, equation transformation is the other. As 
proposed by many researchers, it is difficult to construct a non-linear model, 
especially in accounting. Transformation is used in most applications, in the belief 
that many complex functional relations are intrinsically linear and can be linearized 
by transformation, e.g. logarithms, exponentials, reciprocals and polynomials.    
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The relation between equity market values and accounting numbers will not be 
purely linear in reality, which can be seen from a simple market-book line drawn in 
X-Y bars. The non-linearity draws a concave shape line, suggesting an exponential 
relation between market and book value. A hybrid of the linear and log-linear models, 
the semi-log equation would be a good candidate. 
εββ ++= XLnY 21              (A-17)                        
where Y is the market value and X is the book value. Ln denotes the natural log 
function. The coefficient in a semi-log model has a special meaning. A one-unit 
increase in net asset causes a β-percent increase in stock price. By the same token, a 
one-unit increase in earning could trigger a β-percent increase in return. The effect of 
the semi-log transformation can only be examined empirically.  
I perform balance sheet model (equation 1) regressions on both the 
untransformed and the semi-log transformed data. Annual data is used so I drop the 
survival criterion from my previous sample criteria. 542 firms are picked in 1998, 
655 firms in 1999, 780 firms in 2000 and 884 firms in 2001. Results (not reported in 
detail here) give sufficient evidence that the semi-log model fits better. First, three 
out of four adjusted R squares are higher in semi-log models than in untransformed 
models. Second, as expected, all the coefficients in semi-log models are significant at 
least at 0.1 levels. However, several coefficients in the untransformed models are 
unexpectedly insignificant, for example, the coefficient on BVL is -0.609 (t=-1.627) 
in 1998 and that on BVAH is 0.0237 (t=0.103) in 1999. Third, residual analysis also 
supports the semi-log model. The residuals of the semi-log regressions appear 
approximately normal, while the residuals of the untransformed models exhibit a 
quadratic pattern. Normality is tested by skewness and kurtosis tests and a joint Wald 
test of both skewness and kurtosis. All three tests reject the hypothesis that the 
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residuals are normal for the untransformed models. The results are much better in the 
semi-log models, with skewness and kurtosis much closer to normal distribution 
values. In some cases, normality cannot be rejected despite the high power of the test 
due to large sample sizes. Fourth, the distribution of residuals against fitted values 
indicates a serious heteroskedasticity problem in the untransformed models.46 For the 
semi-log model, heteroskedasticity is not visually apparent. Finally, the histogram of 
standardized residuals presents further evidence that the distribution is much more 
asymmetric for the untransformed models than for the semi-log models. Descriptive 
statistics also indicate that the semi-log model is better in capturing the market-book 
relation. Average net assets increased from 1.81 to 2.19 during the four-year period, 
achieving a 20.99% growth. The average untransformed market value, however, 
achieves a 39.92% growth. The growth rate is for log market value is 18.58%, much 
closer to the one to one book-market theoretical relation. Based on the above 
discussion, the semi-log model should be favored in balance sheet model regression.  
Further comparisons done using the return and price models again favor the 
semi-log models. It is clear that the semi-log transformation is a practical way to 
improve the model fitness in this paper, even if the untransformed balance sheet 
model is appropriate. Therefore, I will use semi-log transformations of equity market 
value and market return. To avoid infinite logarithmic transformations of returns, I 
add 1 to all returns prior to transformation:    
0tRe1     where)tRe1( >++ ttLn                    (A-17) 
                                                 
46 The White (1980) t test could solve this problem in both models. 
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III. Fixed Effects and Random Effects  
Data sets can comprise either time series or cross sections. The data sets that 
combine both are called longitudinal or panel data sets. This paper employs a panel 
in the multivariate regressions. Greene (2003) points out that “the fundamental 
advantage of a panel data set over a cross section is that it will allow the researcher 
great flexibility in modeling differences in behavior across individuals.” A pooled 
regression cannot fully capture the heterogeneity, or individual effects, among 
different firms and years. It is especially important to control the firm and year 
effects in stock market research in China. Firms’ different backgrounds determine 
their different sensitivities to regulations and rules. These specific firm attributes 
should be controlled in market research. For example, the share price of the listed 
companies in western China out-performed the rest of the market when the 
government announced the “Western China Development” Program.  
Fixed effects and random effects are often used to improve estimation of 
regression coefficients by avoiding the omitted variable problem. The fixed effects 
approach takes one “fixed” term as a group-specific constant and assigns each of the 
firm-year observations an independent constant. If the unobserved individual year 
and firm effects are correlated with the regressors, omitting the effects will bias 
estimation of the regressors. The fixed effects regression model is: 
itittiitY εγα +++= xβ
?
 (A-18) 
where Yit is the dependent variable, β and xit are vectors of parameters and 
independent variables, respectively, αi is the firm-specific effect that is fixed across 
years, γt is the year-specific effect that is fixed across firms, and εit is the remaining 
residual (capturing the effect of all omitted variables). The fixed effects are dummy 
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variables that each sum to 1, hence one of the time and one of the firm effects must 
be omitted (and an overall constant permitted) in order to avoid perfect collinearity. 
Results for these dummy variables are not reported in the tables, as they serve 
only a control function to improve estimation of the regressors of interest in this 
research.  
The random effects regression model is based on a random sample from the 
target population. If the sample is random, individual effects are uncorrelated with 
the regressors and randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. That is, 
ittiitit uvY εα ++++= xβ '                    (A- 19) 
where  νi is the random disturbance characterizing the ith observation and is constant 
through time, and ut is the random disturbance characterizing year t, and itε  is the 
remaining residual. 
An important of advantage of the random effects model is increased degrees of 
freedom over the fixed effects model. The sample used in this study, however, is not 
random. A priori, then, I assume the fixed effects model is more appropriate for 
purposes of this study. Nevertheless, as Greene (2003) notes, the distinction is not 
theoretically clear-cut, and it is possible for the assumptions of the random effects 
model to be met in non-random samples. The Hausman specification test (Greene 
2003, 301) assesses the propriety of the random effects assumption. For the panel 
data used in this study, the Hausman test rejects the assumptions of orthogonality 
between the random effects and regressors at less than the 0.01 level for all models. 
Therefore, I employ the fixed effects model in the study. I note, nevertheless, that the 
results using the random effects model on this panel data set are qualitatively similar 
to the fixed effects results reported here. 
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Appendix B: Non-nested Model Test 
I. J Test 
The J test addresses the problem of choosing between two possible sets of 
regressors, where the sets are overlapping but non-nested. That is, the two sets share 
some, but not all, regressors, and there are distinctive regressors in both sets. I 
illustrate the J test in the balance sheet model as an example.  
The null hypothesis H0 is that HCA is the correct model; the alternative H1 is 
that LCM is the correct model. Run the following regressions: 
it43210   ˆ      0    ρψψψψψ +++++= cititititit EVMBVAHBVLBVAMVE   (A-20) 
where citEVˆM  is the fitted market value of equity from equation (5), i.e. from the 
LCM balance sheet model. This LCM fitted value is added into equation (4) to form 
equation (A-20). In this equation, a test of 4ψ = 0 would be a test of null hypothesis 
H0. A significant 4ψ  would reject the null and accept the alternative that LCM is the 
better model. The idea of the J test (which is relatively non-parametric and intuitively 
plausible) is that, if HCA is the correct model and LCM is not the correct model, the 
fitted values from the LCM regression cannot be useful in fitting the HCA regression.  
The J test is symmetric, however, and one can interchange the models and 
repeat the test. That is, run the following regression: 
it43210 '  ˆ'  '  '  0'  '  ρψψψψψ +++++= hititititit EVMBVACBVLBVAMVE     (A-21) 
where hitEVˆM  is the fitted market value of equity from equation (4), i.e. from the 
HCA balance sheet model.  
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The J test can have four possible outcomes: reject HCA only, reject LCM only, 
reject both HCA and LCM, reject neither HCA nor LCM. In most empirically tests, 
models are advanced only as approximately correct for the data analyzed. In this 
situation, and because of shared variables, the J test often rejects both models, but 
rejection can occur at a level considerably lower for one model than the other. Such a 
result qualitatively favors the lower level.  
II. Cox Test 
This likelihood ratio test is an extension of a general test of Cox (1961, 1962). 
Here I illustrate it with the income statement model. Like the J test, the Cox test is 
symmetric, and two tests are performed, in which the LCM and HCA models are 
interchanged. The following does the first test that H0: HCA model is correct; H1: 
LCM model is correct.  
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Reverse the HCA and LCM roles and repeat the above steps to complete the 
two-way tests. The Cox test is generally more powerful than the J test, but is 
essentially parametric, relying on the assumption that the residuals are normally 
distributed (the likelihood ratio is that of the normal distribution). Thus the Cox test 
is less robust than J test. 
III. Vuong Test 
Vuong has provided a likelihood ratio test for model selection to test the null 
hypothesis that the two models are equally close to explaining the “true data 
generating process” against the alternative that one model is closer. For example, if 
we test whether earnings A is closer to true earnings than earnings B, we could 
construct the following equation specified in Dechow (1994): 
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1           (A-22)                        
Equation (A-22) is a simplification obtained from the Vuoung’s original 
procedures. We can obtain the Vuong’s z-statistic by regressing mi on unity. The 
coefficient in this regression will equal ½ Log[RSSb/RSSa] and tells us the mean 
difference in explanatory power between earnings B and earnings A. The standard 
error from the regression tells us whether the relationship is unusual, i.e. if the 
difference is significant. The z-statistic can be obtained by multiplying the t-statistic 
from the regression by ((n-1)/n)1/2. Note that a positive z-statistic implies that the 
residuals produced by the earnings B are larger in magnitude than those from 
earnings A. Hence, a positive and significant z-statistic indicates that earnings A has 
less measurement error. Dechow (1994) clearly illustrates the above procedures. 
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Appendix C: Relative Measurement Error Research 
This appendix illustrates the theory and practical computation for the relative 
measurement error. Measurement error is defined as the difference between book 
value and its corresponding market value, which comprise their intrinsic market 
values and measurement errors. I start this research from the balance sheet model.  
000 mvaMVABVA υ+=  (A-23) 
mvlMVLBVL υ+=  
mvaMVABVA υ+=                                                                                                                                   
(A-23) shows the book-to-market relations in the balance sheet model, where 
MVA0, MVL and MVA denote market values, and umva0, umvl and umva denote 
measurement errors. These measurement errors become the statistical residual.   
residual = - γ1*umva0  - γ2* umvl - γ3*umva                  (A-24)                                    
where γi are estimated coefficients for BVA0, BVL and BVA, respectively (i=1,2,3). 
Absent measurement error, accounting data fit the balance sheet model perfectly, 
leaving no intercept or residual and capitalizing assets and liabilities at the rate of 1. 
If measurement error does exit, we would observe intercepts, residuals and biased 
coefficients in almost all regressions. The measurement error could be either positive 
or negative, depending on its attributes. E.g., fixed assets or contingent liabilities 
might be underestimated, producing a positive measurement error. Measurement 
error causes bias in coefficient estimations, as shown in equation (A-25):  
υγ +−+−+−+= BVABBVLBBVABMVE )1()1(0)1( 3210   (A-25)                     
Bk is the proxy for biases in the coefficients (k = 1, 2, 3). The relative measurement 
error is computed as the relative magnitude of measurement error variance from 
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these coefficients biases, i.e. 222 0  and  , umvaumvlumva σσσ .47 Barth (1991) uses proxies for 
assessing the variance and covariance structures of the measurement error. The 
coefficient biases are expressed with Yi and other variables:                                                                 
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Yi denotes the variance-covariance structures of particular measurement 
errors, ijβ  and 2eiσ are operationally defined as the slope coefficients and residual 
variance obtained from the auxiliary regression specified in equation (A-27): 48 
11312100 eBVABVLBVA +++= βββ   (A-27)                        
22302120 eBVABVABVL +++= βββ  
33203130 eBVLBVABVA +++= βββ  
Barth (1991) estimates the magnitude of Yi through the matrixes in (A-26) and 
(A-27). Choi, et al (1997) further simplifies this procedure in a 2-stage regression. 
The Yi are assessed by the coefficient iφ in the following equation:49  
                                                 
47 Unfortunately, these variances are interact with other variances, forming complex variance-
covariance constructs. 
48 No restrictions are posed in Yi except that there is no relation between two market value 
variables. Different restrictions lead to different computations of relative measurement error. For 
example, Boone (2002) assumes that each measurement error and its underlying market value should 
exert effects on all measurement errors. Barth (1991), however, poses more rigid restrictions. 
49 Seemingly related regression method is used in estimation for HCA and LCM data because 
they are actually related. 
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ωφφφφ ++++= bvabvlbvaerror ZZZMVE 32010    (A-28)                       
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MVE, BVA0, BVL, BVAh, BVAc, ijβ  and 2eiσ  are defined in equation (A-26), 
and Sh/Sc is a scale factor: Sh as the mean value of BVAh and Sc of BVAc.50 
After the magnitude of the variance and covariance structure is estimated, it is 
possible to estimate the magnitude of measurement error variance. However, 
different assumptions lead to different interpretations of the variance and covariance 
structure, and, therefore, different measurement error variance. For this reason, I first 
explore the variance and covariance structure.  
Consider (A-25) without BVA0. Now let BVA0 enter (A-25). Its market value 
MVA0 will interact with its measurement error umva0 and other existing measurement 
errors from assets and liabilities. MVA0 does not interact with other market values.51 
The new measurement error, umva0, will interact with all the market values and 
                                                 
50 Scale differences between BVAH and BVAC, though not large (around 1.04), confound 
comparisons of measurement error variance because variance is a function of scale (i.e. 
Var(sx)=s2Var(x)). Following Barth (1991) and Boone (2002), I multiply the factors in my models. 
51 Market values are assumed to be uncorrelated. 
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measurement errors.52 It is the same for BVL and BVA, so the variance-covariance 
structure could be expressed as (A-29): 
Y1 = σ mva0, umva0 + σ mva0, umvl + σ mva0, umva + σ umvl, umva0 + σ umva, umva0 + σ2umva0   
Y2 = σ mvl, umva0 + σ mvl, umvl + σ mvl, umva + σ umvl, umva0 + σ umva, umvl  + σ2umvl 
 Y3 = σ mva, umva0 + σ mva, umvl + σ mva, umva + σ umva0, umva + σ umvl, umva + σ2umva 
Y1 is the variance and covariance structure for BVA0 and σ2umva0 is the 
measurement error variance for BVA0; Y2 is the structure for BVL and σ2umvl  is the 
measurement error variance for BVL; Y3 is the structure for BVA while the σ2umva is 
the measurement error variance for BVA. Consider that BVA could either be BVAH 
under the HCA or be BVAC under the LCM; the research question is whether their 
measurement error variances, σ2umvah and σ2umvac, are equal.  
Barth (1991) assumes that measurement errors in MVA are uncorrelated with 
other variables. That is to say, the value of some covariances are zero; in Y3, e.g., σ 
mva, umva, σ umva0, umva and σ umvl, umva. In this setting, the variance-covariance structure 
Yi can be reduced to equation (A-30): 
    Y1 = σ mva0, umva0 + σ mva0, umvl + σ umvl, umva0 + σ2umva0     (A-30)                         
 Y2 = σ mvl, umva0 + σ mvl, umvl + σ umvl, umva0 + σ2umvl 
 Y3 = σ mva, umva0 + σ mva, umvl + σ2umva 
                                                 
52 The variance of umva is the focus of this paper because it captures measurement error effects in 
net assets. 
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There is no difference in Y1 and Y2 no matter which accounting convention is 
taken, HCA or LCM. Furthermore, MVA, the market value of write-down assets, 
together with Umva0 and Umvl are constant in both accounting conventions. The only 
difference brought by asset write-down practice is in σ2umva, which is σ2umvah under 
HCA (BVAh) and σ2umvac under LCM (BVAc); Umvaj is either Umvah or Umvac, 
depending on accounting convention. I can assess the relative magnitudes of asset 
write-down measurement errors by comparing Y3 values. An F test is conducted to 
test whether σ2umvac and σ2umvah are equal in statistically.53 If the write-down practice 
produces more measurement error in LCM than in HCA, σ2umvac should be bigger, 
significantly or insignificantly. Barth’s approach is expressed as: 
Y3c - Y3h =σ2umvac - σ2umvah   (A-31) 
   Another view of measurement error imposes no restrictions on equation (A-29) and 
focuses on the integrated effects of measurement error, as in Boone (2002). Boone 
argues that the covariances ignored by Barth (1991) could influence the computation 
of measurement error and the final conclusion. Therefore, he includes the 
covariances omitted in Barth (1991). In Boone’s method, there are two sets of 
variance-covariance structures, Yih from HCA and Yic from LCM. Subtracting Yic 
from Yih yields the following expression: 
    Y1h - Y1c = σ mva0, umvah + σ umvah, umva0 - (σ mva0, umvac + σ umvac, umva0)  (A-32) 
      Y2h - Y2c = σ mvl, umvah  + σ umvah, umvl  - (σ mvl, umvac + σ umvac, umvl ) 
                                                 
53 This test is done in the seemingly unrelated regression model, where SAS reports an F test 
while LIMDEP reports a χ2 test. The degree of freedom is one in this test. This effect of the F and χ2 
should be approximately same here because the F distribution and Chi-square distribution are 
essentially identical with one degree of freedom.  
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 Y3h - Y3c = σ mva, umvah + σ umva0, umvah + σ umvl, umvah + σ2umvah - (σ mva, 
umvac +  σ umva0, umvac + σ umvl, umvac + σ2umvac ) 
Re-arranging (A-32) yields (A-33) as follows: 
 Y1h + Y2h - Y3h - (Y1c + Y2c - Y3c)      (A-33) 
=  σ2umvac - σ2umvah  + (σ mva0, umvah  - σ mva0, umvac) + (σ mvl, umvah  - σ mvl, umvac ) +  
    (σ mva, umvac - σmva, umvach)   =  σ2umvac - σ2umvah   +  ξ  ( ξ >= 0)54 
The null hypothesis that function Y1h + Y2h - Y3h - (Y1c + Y2c - Y3c) >= 0 will be 
rejected only if σ2umvac is significantly smaller than σ2umvah , indicating that the asset 
write-down practice has reduced measurement error effectively. In other situations, 
the function is biased towards a positive value under.  
                                                 
54 ξ = (σ mva0, umvah  - σ mva0, umvac) + (σ mvl, umvah  - σ mvl, umvac ) + (σ mva, umvac -  σ mva, 
umvah). Here I prove that ξ > = 0: 
[i] σ mva0, umvah - σ mva0, umvac = Cov (mva0, Umvah) - Cov (mva0, Umvac) = Corr (mva0, 
Umvah) [Var(mva0)Var(Umvah)]1/2 - Corr (mva0, Umvac) [Var(mva0)Var(Umvac)]1/2        
- Corr (mva0, Umvac) [Var(mva0)Var(Umvac)]1/2         
Because Cov(mva, Umvah) = Cov (mva, Umvac) <0 , Cov (mva, mva0) >0, and Umvah > 
Umvac. Cov (mva, mva0) > 0 , so Corr (mva0, Umvah) = Corr(mva0, Umvac) <0 and Umvah > 
Umvac, then Corr (mva0, Umvah) = Corr(mva0, Umvac) <0, [Var(mva0)Var(Umvah)]1/2 > 
[Var(mva0)Var(Umvac)]1/2, and    σ mva0, umvah - σ mva0, umvac < 0;     
[ii] σ mvl, umvah - σ mvl, umvac = Cov (mvl, Umvah) - Cov (mvl, Umvac)                             
= Corr (mvl, Umvah) [Var(mvl)Var(Umvah)]1/2 - Corr (mvl, Umvac) [Var(mvl)Var(Umvac)]1/2  
Because, Cov(mva, Umvah) = Cov (mva, Umvac)<0, Cov(mva, mvl) <0, Umvah > Umvac, 
So Corr (mvl, Umvah) = Corr (mvl, Umvac) > 0, [Var(mvl)Var(Umvah)]1/2 > 
[Var(mvl)Var(Umvac)]1/2.    Then σ mvl, umvah - σ mvl, umvac > 0  
[iii] σ mva, umvac - σ mva, umvah = Cov (mva, Umvac)- Cov(mva, Umvah)                             
= Corr (mva, Umvac) [Var(mva)Var(Umvac)]1/2 -Corr (mva, Umvah) [Var(mva)Var(Umvah)]1/2  
Because Corr (mva, Umvac) = Corr (mva, Umvah) <0 and Umvah > Umvac, so, σ mva, umvac - σ 
mva, umvah >0  
Combine [i], [ii] and [iii] together to get ξ in equation (A-33). Though [i] is negative, the absolute 
value is much smaller compared with that of [ii] and [iii], because the magnitude of MVA0 (assets not 
affected by the write-down regulation) is much smaller than that of MVL and MVA, and because 
covariance is a magnitude-sensitive metric, I expect the negative part [i] to be smaller in absolute 
value than the positive part [ii]+[iii]. As a result, I expect ξ to net to a positive signed value.   
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